20¢ APRIL 17, 1950

New Republic

LATTIMORE STRIKES BACK

Text of his Senate testimony

THE HIGH COURT LOOKS AT JIM CROW

By CHARLES THOMPSON

ATOMIC PEACE AND ATOMIC POLITICS

Last of a series

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New Republic Editor on Tour

¶ MICHAEL STRAIGHT, Editor of the *New Republic*, is leaving on a coast-to-coast speaking tour that will take him to twenty major cities.

¶ His tour is arranged by the American Veterans Committee, but he will be speaking on national and international issues before open meetings, town-hall forums, trade-union locals, student gatherings, and luncheons and dinners arranged by *New Republic* readers. One of his main purposes is to meet and talk to our readers and to gather editorial material for the magazine.

¶ His itinerary for the first ten days, with meetings arranged so far, follows. Next week the remainder of the itinerary will be published in this space. Further details for those who can attend the meetings or arrange further discussions can be obtained from the *New Republic* at 40 East 49th Street, New York City, or from Local AVC Chairmen, whose names and addresses are given below.

***Atlanta, Ga.* – Monday, April 17**
Mr. Les Persells, Chairman AVC
1085 Blue Ridge Avenue, N. E.
Meeting schedueld: 8:30 PM
Central YMCA.

***Tampa, Fla.* – Tuesday, April 18**
Mr. Leo Gutuerrez, Chairman AVC
Box 5563
Meeting scheduled: 3 PM Dedicate AVC Clubhouse, 1806—17th Street.

***Tallahasse, Fla.*, – Wed., April 19**
Meeting scheduled: 12:30 PM
Florida State University.

***Nashville, Tenn.* – Thursday, April 20**
Mr. Mason McKinney, Chairman AVC
718 Woodland Street
Meetings scheduled: Bethlehem Center, 1417 Charlotte Ave., Dinner 7 PM for members and guests; 8 PM public meeting. Topic: "Attack on Tolerance and Civil Rights in Government Service."

***St. Louis, Mo.* – Friday, April 21**
Mr. Marvin Boisseau
6625 Pershing Street
Meeting scheduled: 8 PM
Cabany Library, 1106 N. Union.

***Kansas City, Mo.* –**
Saturday & Sunday, April 22–23
Mr. James Walton, Chairman AVC
3605 Gillham Road, Tel. Lucerne 1227
Meetings scheduled: Dinner 6:30 PM, April 22, Community Christian Church, 46th and Main; 10 AM, April 23, Forum of Unitarian Church, 3425 Baltimore; Radio appearance April 22.

***Topeka, Kansas* – Monday, April 24**
Mr. Marc Karson, Chairman AVC
Washburn Municipal University
Meeting scheduled: 11 A M
Washburn Municipal University.

***Tulsa, Okla.* – Tuesday, April 25**
Mr. Howard McHenry, Chairman AVC
215 South Gillette Street
Meetings scheduled: 10 AM, Student Assembly, Tulsa University Campus; 6:30 PM, State AVC Conference, YWCA.

***Houston, Texas* – Wednesday, April 26**
Mr. Al Schulman, Chairman AVC
309 Scanlon Building
Meeting scheduled: 8 PM
Chamber of Commerce Assembly Hall.

ANNOUNCEMENT OF MEETINGS IN AUSTIN, TEXAS, LOS ANGELES, SAN FRANCISCO, PORTLAND, SEATTLE, MILWAUKEE, MADISON, MINNEAPOLIS AND CHICAGO WILL BE MADE NEXT WEEK.

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New Republic

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WASHINGTON WIRE

FIVE YEARS AGO this Wednesday (April 15) Harry Truman became President. The record of his subsequent ups and downs has been as jagged and spectacular as the New York skyline. The bottom was reached when Republicans took control of the 80th Congress; the top when Our Harry fooled the experts in November, 1948. That seemed to please nearly everybody but the experts. Since then there has been a slow decline.



We don't know, as this is written, what Truman will do on the Kerr bill, which exempts independent natural-gas producers from federal control. If he signs it, we think it will bring his prestige way, way down. As we appraise the Kerr bill, it runs counter to all the brave, progressive things Truman said when he stumped the country to victory in '48.

Truman's difficulty on the Kerr bill is his own fault. If he vetoes it he will repudiate Administration leader Sam Rayburn (of Texas), who backed it apparently with White House support. If he signs it he will seem to repudiate all his liberal professions. This could have been avoided. Kerr's legislation just squeaked through Senate and House. An extraordinarily fine job of mobilizing consumer opposition was done by Senator Douglas (D, Ill.). One hint from the White House at this stage would have killed the measure. Instead the bill emerged as a touchstone of Truman's sincerity.

Truman's big five-year achievement was the Marshall Plan. His record of postwar international coöperation has been good. But American policy has failed in China, is now threatened in Korea and Greece. Truman has failed to keep the nation united behind him on foreign affairs through the White House medium of publicity and the "fireside-chat" technique. He threw away a once-in-a-lifetime chance to appeal to the world on the H-bomb decision.

On domestic affairs the record is one of some accomplishment, greater frustration. America now has one more of its familiar coalition governments; Democratic Party discipline became virtually nonexistent once the election was won. The present Congress will quicken its pace from now on. Truman may be able to boost output by his speech-making trip early in May. The moral we draw from these five years is the sad gap between promise and performance under our lax party discipline and our habit of relying on one man rather than on a coherent political organization.

For a year the State Department has been on dead center on Far Eastern policy, apparently fearful of "pro-Communist" charges if it adopted a realistic approach, like Britain's, to the present Chinese government. The importance of GOP recruits like Dulles is the greater courage their presence may give the Department in doing what is obviously needful. Acheson's brave crackdown on Korea and Greece are examples in point. There is a price to pay for receiving dollars: the price of encouraging democracy. Acheson will be denounced by McCarthy, no doubt, but his course is encouraging.

The Associated Press last week stated, then withdrew, then reaffirmed, a story from The Hague declaring that a mysterious "high American defense official" had proposed bypassing British War Minister John Strachey with military secrets because of Strachey's previous sympathy to the professed aims of Soviet socialism. The unnamed figure who made this statement was, of course, Louis Johnson, sometimes characterized in Washington as "the only bull who carries his own china shop with him." We hold no brief for Strachey. But in days to come we must either accept different standards of what constitutes political availability in top officials abroad or end hopes of coöperation.

Owen Lattimore's exposure of the use by the "China lobby" of McCarthy as their dupe and mouthpiece is pretty complete. It was a great show, played to a packed house. We have a hunch the public is getting sick of McCarthy and

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his antics. But "McCarthyism" may outlive the originator. Its roots go deep. America is facing a changed, insecure world. For the first time in all its existence it lives daily in peacetime with doubt and apprehension. Other countries have known this feeling for years; America learns it for the first time. In this difficult adjustment come the spy trials, the frustration of losing A-bomb monopoly and the failure of policy in China. It's human nature to look for a scapegoat. Both the time and temptation were ripe for young, plausible McCarthy to introduce his note of sensationalism and diabolism.

By ordering Camel and Old Gold cigarettes to cease false advertising, the Federal Trade Commission threw new light on the indorsement racket. Two other firms, Lucky Strike and Philip Morris, will be heard later. In a sample count, 43 Camel testimonialists were called in, the FTC reports: their reason for signing the ads was mercenary in practically all cases. Some of the celebrities and others you have seen indorsing Camels, the FTC says, actually prefer another brand; some don't smoke; some testified they had signed the testimonials without reading; and "some testified that they could not even read."

Notes. The big GOP drive against the Census enumeration of income as a political issue seems to have flopped. Compilation is going on without incident. . . . We have always reverently believed there was a bit of Christ in every man; there was more than a bit in the late Nathan Robertson, our beloved fellow newsman for many years. In the future, we hope, the memory of his indefatigable idealism will spur us on when we flag or falter. A Nathan Robertson memorial is indicated. . . . It's increasingly hard to see what Truman will boast about in the 81st Congress when he takes the stump in May; you can't win an election on ending the margarine tax and passing the Kerr bill. . . . Does the American public like to be fooled? McCarthy slapped his chest and said, "Sue me for libel," last Saturday—and then failed to repeat his basic Senate charges of espionage and Communism on which the whole point turns. Can you fool all the people all the time?

Washington T. R. B.

CORRESPONDENCE

Tidelands Oil

SIR: Mr. Harold L. Ickes' article in the *New Republic* for March 27 on the subject of oil in the submerged coastal lands omitted several relevant and important facts which were known to him, or were easily ascertainable, and which completely refute the defamatory accusations made by him in the article.

For a clear understanding of the matters discussed by Mr. Ickes, it is necessary to keep in mind the distinction between the three-mile marginal belt of open sea along the coast of California, on the one hand, and the bays, harbors, and other navigable inland waters along that coast, on the other hand. The litigation between the United States and California which resulted in the Supreme Court's decision of June 23, 1947, involved only the lands lying beneath the three-mile marginal belt. . . . As Mr. Ickes, while serving as Secretary of the Interior, stated before the Senate Judiciary Committee on February 5, 1946, with respect to the lands under bays, harbors, and other navigable inland waters, the United States did not make any claim to these lands in the litigation against the state of California, inasmuch as the courts had already held that such lands are owned by the . . . states. . . .

On June 23, 1947, the Supreme Court announced the general rule of law that the federal government has paramount rights in and power over the three-mile marginal belt of open sea along the California coast, and that an incident of such rights and power "is full dominion over the resources of the soil under that water area, including oil." (United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 38-39.)

However, the Court did not have before it at that time, and did not undertake to make any determination respecting, the problem of precisely where . . . the line should be drawn to separate the submerged lands of the United States . . . and the state-owned lands beneath the waters of bays, harbors and other navigable inland waters. . . . The matter of establishing the actual line of demarcation . . . awaited further judicial proceedings.

In the meantime, the United States and California were faced with the necessity of making some provision for the continued production of oil from wells previously drilled under state leases in the areas respecting which, following the Supreme Court's decision, uncertainty existed. . . . As Attorney General Clark and Secretary of the Interior Krug stated in similar letters which they jointly sent on July 22, 1947, to the . . . Senate and House Committees on Public Lands:

> The most urgent problem which confronted the Government on June 23, 1947, was the necessity of assuring continued oil production in the coastal waters off California. The nation is now faced with a serious scarcity of petroleum and petroleum products; unless continued production could be assured, the equipment presently in operation off California might be permanently injured and, indeed, the oil wells might be rendered useless for all time if the waters of the ocean were permitted to seep into them.

. . . As an interim solution of the problem outlined above, the United States and California on July 26, 1947, entered into the so-called operating stipulation which is criticized in Mr. Ickes' article. So far as I am aware, there was no dissent among the officials of the Interior and Justice Departments. . . .

Among other things, the operating stipulation provides that, while it remains in effect: (a) operations carried on under any lease issued by the state prior to June 23, 1947 . . . on tidelands or submerged lands along the coast of California may continue; (b) with the advance approval of the Secretary of the Interior, the state shall, to the extent permissible under state law, enter into new leases "in cases where it is necessary to do so in order to prevent drainage of oil or gas from tide or submerged lands by wells drilled on other lands, or to protect the respective interests of the parties hereto"; (c) the state will segregate and hold in a special fund all moneys received by the state after June 23, 1947, as a result of oil and gas operations in the tidelands and submerged lands along the coast; and (d) after it shall have been decided, with respect to any particular oil-producing area along the California coast, just where the dividing line runs . . . the money received by the state from oil and gas operations in that area and placed in the special fund will be distributed in accordance with the respective interests of the parties and pursuant to agreement between the United States and California or, in the absence of agreement, a judicial order or decree. . . . The term of the stipulation has been extended twice, and it is now scheduled to expire on September 29, 1950. . . .

It is upon the facts set out above that Mr. Ickes, wholly without justification, bases his defamatory references to "a steal of public property of the greatest magnitude in American history," to "Teapot Dome," to the "connivance" of public officials, to "the crime of the American centuries," and to the necessity for certain officials "to attempt to convince the people whose interests are being betrayed that they have not been faithless to the trust assumed by them."

Actually, the interests of the United States are fully protected by the operating stipulation. To the extent that oil is produced under the stipulation from lands which the Supreme Court ultimately holds to be lands beneath the three-mile marginal belt . . . the lessor's share of the

(*Continued on page* 31)

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VOLUME 122, NUMBER 16, ISSUE 1846, NEW YORK CITY, APRIL 17, 1950 **New Republic**

ATOMIC PEACE AND ATOMIC POLITICS

HAVING REVIEWED the formulation of the original US proposals for the international control of atomic energy and the history of the negotiations and debate in the United Nations, we are now in position to examine whether alternative courses of action with respect to control are technically sound and politically feasible.

What follows is an analysis of what we believe to be the *rational bases* of international negotiations. By "rational" we mean two things: first, the bases of a system which will afford as much security as can be expected in the real world of today; second, a set of proposals which may have some chance of surviving the cross-fire of negotiations. We make no claim that ours is a full-fledged plan; we think, however, that we have indicated firmer ground on which further negotiations could *begin* than any yet described.

Our point of departure is the *New Republic's* editorial of November 7, 1949, which offered suggestions for a fresh agenda in international atomic-energy discussions. These suggestions will be amplified and we shall consider their relation to the political issues now dividing the East and West.

The essential elements can most usefully be grouped in four categories:

Sanctions: in most respects a dead issue, yet one which must be thoroughly understood as a preliminary to the later categories; (2) proposals which would require the Soviets to modify their position on controls; (3) proposals which would require the US and the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission majority to modify their stand; and (4) a final category of issues on which the US and Soviet positions are not very far apart, or have not been clarified, or where mutual "concessions" would have to be roughly equal.

Sanctions

In the preceding discussion of the UNAEC negotiations, it was shown that the elimination of the Great Power veto in the Security Council (to apply sanctions against infractions) was mainly Bernard Baruch's idea; that the other delegations of the UNAEC majority had opposed it as early as 1946. The US has not only refrained from pressing the issue since Baruch's resignation, but has delicately admitted that sanctions are not essential. All that can reasonably be expected of an international control system, it is generally agreed, is what W. T. R. Fox has called "a reliable fire-alarm system" to give clear and timely warning of major violations of the control system.[1] In other words, a control plan cannot ensure that atomic and hydrogen bombs will not be made and used before the end of a major war, *if such a war starts*. It can prevent an atomic-arms race from being a prime contributing cause of war; and it can prevent the secret accumulation of atomic armaments to be used in a surprise attack by an aggressor.*

To be effective against an atomic-treaty violator, sanctions must be acts of war, or, at the very least, threats to wage war. If sanctions are applied, the violator will either agree to put a stop to its illegal activities or will persist in them—a course which is itself an act of war. The unintentional violator will not invoke the veto; on the other hand, if a deliberate and persistent violator invokes the veto, the other nations will not, for obvious reasons of self-defense, be stayed by it. In either circumstance the veto is irrelevant.

Changes Required of the Soviets

Inspection. Inspection to guard against clandestine activities is an essential feature of atomic controls. Such activities include the secret illegal mining and concentration of uranium ore, and the manufacture of U-235, plutonium, or the isotopes for hydrogen bombs.

As it is the keystone of any control system, so it has

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[1] Footnotes giving source references appear on page 13.

*With a "fire-alarm" plan, what are the major dangers of which timely warning must be given? The UNAEC majority has succinctly listed these as diversion, clandestine operations, and seizure. (*Third Report* of the UNAEC, Annex 2).

1. "*Diversion*" is the secret and illegal removal of fissionable materials (in practice, principally plutonium) from legally authorized production plants, whether these plants be internationally owned and operated, or nationally owned and internationally controlled and inspected. (Diversion is a significant danger or problem only if atomic-power production on a considerable scale is authorized.)

2. "*Seizure*" is the taking over by national military forces of the production plants for the purpose of using their fissionable production for the making of bombs. (Seizure, like diversion, is a danger which exists only when large-scale atomic-power production is authorized.)

3. "*Clandestine operations*" refers to the production of fissionables (and to this we must now add the production of the ingredients of hydrogen bombs) in secret and illegal plants, or any of the steps in the production chain from mines to reactors. (This is a danger which continues to exist even if large-scale atomic-power production is *not* authorized, and it is probably also the principal danger if large-scale atomic-power production is permitted.)

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proved a sticking point. The Russians have consistently rejected the majority inspection scheme; the US and its followers have refused to modify it. What is the nature of the impasse?

The provisions (against clandestine activities) as outlined by the majority of the UNAEC in its *Second Report* were: (a) systematic aerial surveys of up to five percent of any nation's territory every two years; (b) aerial surveys of the area immediately surrounding known deposits of uranium and thorium, or where deposits are thought to exist; (c) further aerial surveys of any areas where the International Atomic Energy Commission suspected clandestine activities; (d) ground surveys of declared or suspected uranium and thorium resources; (e) inspection by the international agency of the manufacture of equipment and materials essential to the production processes of nuclear technology, such as beryllium, heavy water, pure graphite, etc.

With the possible exceptions of a check on the manufacture of essential materials,[3] and "special investigations" by the international control agency on suspicion of illegal activities, the Soviet delegates to the United Nation were unwilling to accept any of the foregoing provisions.

While there can be no doubt that the Soviet position on inspection for clandestine activities is entirely inadequate, there is serious question whether the majority's inspection proposals provide the only practical and effective safeguards; whether, in conjunction with a system of national ownership and "negligible plutonium production," a set of effective precautions acceptable to the Soviets could not be devised.

From the beginning, Soviet spokesmen have been vehement in their opposition to aerial surveys. The three types of survey would provide a series of maps showing the location of industrial plants, hydroelectric installations, bridges, rail lines and marshaling yards—the ideal Baedeker, in other words, for bombing missions in a future war. Secrecy is one of Russia's main strategic counters to the technical superiority and greater industrial power of the US. It is absurd, therefore, to expect or to pretend to expect that the Soviet government would readily surrender this advantage.

Fortunately this need not be a breaking point. The implications of the UN's *Second Report*, and of preceding discussions in UNAEC committees, are that aerial surveys would be helpful in determining potential uranium deposits, in detecting illegally operated mines, uranium-ore concentrating plants, and U-235 and plutonium-production plants. There is reason to believe that such surveys would be ineffective for some of these purposes and not indispensable for any.

The aerial spotting of potential ore deposits is an uncertain procedure guaranteeing only a small return for the effort involved. Neither Canadian nor US authorities, eager as they are to find additional uranium deposits, have relied on this method; instead, they have engaged in systematic test drilling of sample rock cores in areas of known deposits and have encouraged private prospectors to use traditional ground-exploration methods, aided by Geiger counters.[3]

Early in 1946 a group of leading geologists and engineers reviewed the raw-materials survey and inspection problem for the Carnegie Endowment, the Geological Society of America and the American Institute of Mining and Metal Engineers. The measures these experts proposed were far less sweeping than those of the UN majority, especially with respect to aerial surveys. This group felt that it was "hardly feasible to attempt aerial surveys of large areas," and indicated that such surveys should be limited primarily to the immediate vicinity of known deposits and known producing areas and mines. It is important to note, also, that they believed that some 200 inspectors, with appropriate technical qualifications, stationed at the known world centers of uranium production, and some several hundred in total, would be "able to develop and successfully apply an international inspection system" as to raw materials.[4]

The other purposes of aerial surveys would be to uncover the illicit construction and operation of U-235 separation plants, plutonium-producing reactors, and hydrogen-isotope-production plants. It was thought that even if the operations themselves were conducted underground—in caves, for example—aerial photographs would reveal the surrounding roads, rail lines and power-transmission lines. Ground inspectors could, of course, do the job more thoroughly, but a swarm of roving agents would scarcely suit the Russians any better than unlimited aerial surveys. A large force, however, may not be necessary. Because the atomic-energy business is the complex sum of many separate enterprises, it lends itself to inspection more easily than a simpler industry. Most large reactors require immense supplies of clear water, the sources of which are both known and not unlimited; great quantities of electric power are used in the production of U-235 and for other processes of nuclear engineering, and the large turbines and generators that are needed to produce this power can be manufactured only by a small number of highly specialized plants; and essential materials such as beryllium and graphite must be produced in separate plants. These facts, among others, facilitate the establishment of a dependable system of cross-checks, sensitive to any one

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This is the third and last of the series prepared by the Editors, dealing with the problem of international agreement on atomic energy.

With the New Republic *of April 3, there was published a special technical "handbook" on the scientific, military and economic aspects of atomic energy, including the hydrogen bomb, useful for reference in connection with the three articles in this series.* – THE EDITORS

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of the many characteristic indices of illegal production.

One must realize, moreover, that the search for illegal plants is only a second line of defense where plutonium production itself is limited to small amounts. If large-scale plutonium production is permitted, the quantities of ores and finished materials to be kept under surveillance will also be large. If, on the other hand, plutonium production is held down, the control problem assumes "definable boundaries." A firm schedule of limited ore quotas enforced by an efficient inspection system centered at the mines, a continuing survey to discover new ore deposits, and a small supervisory staff to check on a very few "declared" plants as well as on the key industries whose product is essential to the operation of atomic reactors, would constitute a surveillance pattern difficult to circumvent.

It is commonly assumed that the vastness of the USSR would make inspection a particularly difficult task. In the field of atomic energy, this might not be the case. The rail network is thin; improved roads are almost nonexistent; per-capita electric-power production is rather low and there are only a limited number of large units capable of generating the volume required for production of fissionables on a significant scale. It is possible, therefore, that sections of the Soviet Union as large as an average-sized American state could be inspected by a small team of technical men in a few weeks.

Briefly, then, as regards the technical side of inspection for clandestine activities, the Soviets would certainly have to concede much more than they have done; yet there are alternatives to the majority position which appear to be equally effective and politically possible. The inspection formula outlined above seems to us to fulfill these requirements. Its political acceptability can be tested; the assessment of its merits and shortcomings, from the security standpoint, should be undertaken by various competent specialists, not left to the mercy of statesmen.

Changes Required of the West

Transition stages. The proposal that the control plan should take effect in "stages," the Russians being admitted to successive arcana only after demonstrating their dependability during the execution of the preceding stage, was a political device based on what was proved to be the mistaken premise that the US monopoly of bomb production would be retained for a considerable period. From the outset it was evident that the Soviets would not accept the proposal unless they themselves were incapable of making bombs *and* were prepared to admit it publicly. These contingencies are no longer matters for speculation. The rationale of staging has vanished with the monopoly.

What lay behind this proposal? It was feared by the US that if the entire control system were applied to all stages of the production process at about the same time, the Russians would be able, very quickly, to discover American "secrets" by inspection of Oak Ridge, Los Alamos and Hanford, while they might delay and obstruct the disclosure of their own "secrets"—the principal one being the extent of their uranium resources. The Russians might then—at least so it was argued—break off the control agreement, leaving us bereft of "secrets" (illiterately regarded as the most precious of national treasures) while they still retained most of theirs.[5] The Russians, in turn, feared that if the control system were initiated by a raw-materials survey, the majority might break off the agreement when they had learned all they needed to know.

The US fear of losing out in the horse-trading of "secrets" was, as many scientists and other level heads had repeatedly warned, ill-founded if for no other reason than that we had few "secrets" to lose. What we did have was a non-communicable technological and industrial superiority and the knowledge of certain important nuclear engineering methods which, as events have shown, were apparently not beyond the capabilities of Russia, not to mention at least four or five other nations. The loss through espionage of even temporary advantages could not have been a major one, leading scientists inform us, despite the contrary assertions of the press, the federal police, members of Congress and others of equal competence.

Today if an international inspection staff visited the uranium mines in Czechoslovakia, the Belgian Congo, Canada and the United States; the plants at Hanford, Oak Ridge, and Los Alamos in the United States; Chalk River in Canada; Harwell in Great Britain; and comparable Soviet establishments, the Western powers would learn as much of value as would the Russians. The Russians might gain knowledge of short cuts in production methods and the like, but it is safe to assume that from published sources alone they have already been able to make fair estimates of uranium resources accessible to the US, production rates and stockpiles. The West, on the other hand, would be able to assess Soviet engineering progress and capabilities, ascertain the location and, to a considerable extent, the magnitude of Soviet uranium resources, and the location of Russian atomic plants. Any general staff, it seems to us, would prefer the Western end of the bargain.

If the rationale of transition stages is no longer valid, it is to our interest to press for the application of the full panel of inspection and control measures as quickly as possible. No other course is politically tenable. There are few aspects of this business where the road is so well marked, where the change in circumstances so plainly requires a modification of our stand—a modification to our distinct strategic advantage.

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Neutral Points

1. *Prohibition of the use of atom and hydrogen bombs and the disposal of stockpiles of fissionable material.* Since the fall of 1948 the Russians have insisted that the manufacture of atom bombs and the right to use them in the event of war be prohibited simultaneously with the adoption of a control agreement. This, in effect, was their answer to the American proposal on "stages." In turn, the Russian proposal was rejected; yet it was not stated by the majority at what determinable future date and under what circumstances the right to use bombs and to manufacture fissionables would be abrogated.

Indeed, since the UNAEC majority, as clearly shown by the record, never concretely delineated the transition stages, the Soviet delegates had to content themselves with the inference[6] that prohibitions against the manufacture and stockpiling of fissionables, and the use of atomic weapons, would go into effect *only after other stages of the plan had been completed to the satisfaction of a majority of the international commission and all controls had been instituted.*

The UNAEC majority might have justified its stand somewhat as follows:

As long as the US is the sole manufacturer of fissionables and bombs, the simultaneous prohibition advocated by the Russians is (1) unnecessary because American intentions are obviously peaceful and (2) unacceptable because the US cannot be expected to yield its military advantages without a substantial Russian *quid pro quo*, including the renunciation of secrecy as to the location of military establishments, the suspension of the veto in atomic matters, the assumption of the probationary period in staging and so on.* Given the monopoly premise and the prevailing international situation, this position is understandable. If we gave up our bombs, what protection would we have against the numerically superior Russian army? While an invasion of the US is not to be feared, what is to prevent the Russians from overrunning Europe? These and kindred questions—and fears—go to the heart of the problem of atomic controls, of disarmament, of establishing peace.

Yet if preventive war against Russia is ruled out; if it is admitted that a world armaments race most likely will end in a catastrophic war; and, further, that the relative military balance between Russia and the US, with the atomic monopoly already broken, will gradually shift more in Russia's favor (at least so far as Europe and Asia are concerned), the US has now no better choice than to strive for a pact of immediate atomic and general disarmament. (Nor does Russia have a better choice, since in an atomic war she would suffer at least as heavily as the US—even if she were to retain her numerically superior armed force.) Without doubt it would be an imperfect agreement; it would, however, lessen the probability of war and it could be framed so as to place neither Russia nor the US—if war should come—in a worse position than if there had been no disarmament agreement. This at least must be the goal of further negotiations.

How actually to dispose of the existing stocks of fissionables, assuming that Russia and the US were to agree on the principle, is a most vexing question. Neither side has been explicit on this point. The UN majority spoke generally of transferring stockpiles to an international authority, but said nothing of their physical location or in what form the materials should be kept, pending their possible use for atomic power. The Soviet delegates were equally vague; they merely suggested that stocks of fissionables be reserved for peacetime use.[7]

Would the proponents of "strategic balance" in the world distribution of atomic reactors advocate a "strategic" distribution of existing stocks of fissionables? Very likely not. Fissionables, if illegally seized, are immediately convertible into weapons, and the "alarm" would scarcely afford sufficient warning of aggressive intent to do much good. Would it be feasible, as a tentative measure, until full controls had been instituted and world tensions had been partially relieved, to leave existing stockpiles where they are under a kind of UN escrow? The proposal perhaps deserves further attention. It would have to be coupled, of course, with an agreement (1) cutting further plutonium production to negligible amounts, and (2) forbidding the manufacture of bombs and renouncing their use in future. This would not, it should be reëmphasized, constitute a final agreement, but rather an initial step toward broader accord.

Various "ingenious" devices proposed as safeguards against the sudden illegal seizure of fissionables by an aggressor—neutral island repositories, within equal bombing distance of Russia and the US, heavily mined, under UN guard, etc., etc.—are so complicated and unreal as to require no discussion. The problem is not to be solved by contrivances.

It is possible to "denature" pure U-235 so that a considerable effort and large plants would be required to reconstitute the material and make it suitable for use, either for bombs or power. However, official statements issued after the appearance of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, with its reference to denaturing, would seem to indicate that a similar process might not be as feasible for plutonium.[8]

No one in official position has yet had the courage to propose the destruction of existing stocks of fissionables. There is no reason to doubt that this is technically feasible, without risk; nor is it an extravagant step from the

*"There appears to be little doubt that at the present time our unique possession of the facilities and weapons of atomic energy constitutes military advantages which we only reluctantly would lay down." J. R. Oppenheimer in *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, February, 1948.

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standpoint of the economic loss involved—compare it, for example, with Senator McMahon's proposal to spend $50 billion in five years on an expanded Marshall Plan in order to buy atomic peace. (The "common-sense" objection that the US cannot, in the present state of the world, afford to deprive itself of so formidable a military asset, merely begs the question, if atomic control is intended seriously.)

Some additional data as to costs may be in order. If US and Russian stores of fissionables (U-235 and plutonium) are together of the order of 2.5 tons (see the Technical Handbook published with the *New Republic* of April 3, 1950, p. 4, "Bomb Production Rate and Size of US Bomb Stockpile"), the maximum potential energy wasted by the destruction of existing stocks would be the equivalent, roughly, of the quantity of energy to be derived from 7.5 million tons of coal—to be compared with the current total world production of more than 100 million tons of coal *per month*.[9] We may assume that the fissionables we own cost well under $5 billion; this is less than a third of the annual arms budget, less than a tenth of the amount envisaged in the McMahon plan, and on the order of two percent of the nation's gross *annual* product. Finally, it is worth remembering that atomic power is not in prospect for a decade or two, at least, and that "breeding" methods, if successful, would assure a future supply of fissionables in comparison to which existing stockpiles are insignificant.

An effective control system also requires the dismantling of major atomic plants. Even under the majority UN plan, as we have seen (and as one student of the control problem has pointed out), this would be a necessary step.[10] For Specific Proposal XI in Chapter 5 of the UNAEC *Second Report* states that: "(c) *Dangerous facilities shall be provided for nations only as world conditions of security warrant and where economic justification exists.*" Since weapon manufacture would be prohibited, and "economic justification" for the large-scale production of fissionables is at present non-existent, it follows that under the Majority Plan, if properly construed, K-25 and Hanford, as well as similar plants in Russia and other countries, would have to be dismantled. Again, as in the destruction of stockpiles, the major factors are psychological, political and military, rather than economic.

2. *National production quotas and international ownership.* The allocation of large atomic reactors ("strategic balance") poses, as we have already indicated, insoluble political problems in the divided world of today. The UNAEC majority seems to have recognized this fact (as shown by the circumstance, among others, that detailed discussion of the subject was pointedly avoided), but held back from drawing its logical implications—namely, give up the notion of a large atomic-power industry for an initial period of the control treaty, say 10 to 20 years, and eliminate the features incorporated in the plan for the express purpose of controlling a large-scale industry. It will take one or two decades to ascertain whether atomic power is technically and economically sound; meanwhile experimentation can be safely conducted in pilot reactors, either under national control coupled with inspection, or international operation, or both. (The entire annual plutonium output of such pilot models need only be of the order of 10-20 kilograms or one to two bombs a year and the quota of requisite ores correspondingly small.[11]) At a later date, when and if atomic power is needed, the control system can be appropriately modified.

Which of the main clauses of the Majority Plan become superfluous if plutonium production is limited? International ownership has hitherto been considered indispensable to an effective control system, to guard against diversion regardless of the efficiency of inspection. Yet this is a doubtful requirement unless large-scale plutonium production is envisaged; in that case the magnitude of the operation might so increase the danger of illegal diversion of fissionables that every possible safeguard should be adopted.

International politics has its own variant of the rule of Occam's Razor. The hypotheses of negotiation should be held to a minimum. If international ownership is primarily justified by large-scale plutonium production; if the latter is not merely unnecessary but would probably be prohibited initially even under the Majority Plan, why insist upon the ownership proposal on the ground that under certain future contingencies it may be needed? Limited plutonium production in nationally owned plants, coupled with an adequate inspection system, constitute a much safer ensemble, in our opinion, than large-scale production in internationally owned plants. Limited production in international plants would be still better, but this is politically unfeasible. If the international-ownership proposal is eliminated, along with large atomic plants, one of the main issues on which the Russians have been most vocal and adamant may be settled

Basic Military and Political Issues

1. *USSR.* From the foregoing analysis, it seems to us evident that a more realistic alternative to the partly completed UN Majority Plan can be devised. What are the chances of its acceptance by the Soviet and the non-Soviet world?

First, the Soviet side. It is an almost universal belief in the West that the Politburo rejected the Baruch and UN Majority Plans for atomic control solely because international inspection was a condition impossible for

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the USSR to accept. The formal Soviet position in UN negotiations has frequently been oversimplified and misrepresented as rejecting inspection of any kind. Earlier in this series it was pointed out that while the Soviet's stand on this point is grossly inadequate, it is by no means one of complete rejection; and it is not helpful to pretend that it is. There has been double-talk, to be sure, but it has certainly not been limited to one side.

It is a crucial fact of the history of atomic politics that in all the past negotiations the Western nations have never with single-minded determination pressed the Soviet delegates for an unequivocal answer to the inspection question; they have failed, in other words (and the failure is unmistakably deliberate, whatever diplomatic stratagems may be behind it), to make the Russians put up or shut up on this single central issue. Instead, the majority has demanded of the Russians that they accept a complex and in part vague congeries of proposals including international ownership and management, transition stages and sanctions, aerial surveys and production quotas—in response to which the Russians could argue with some plausibility that they were being asked to buy a pig in a poke, indeed, to entrust their political, military and, possibly, economic destiny to an international commission the control of which, by overwhelming majority, lay with a group of nations outspokenly hostile to Soviet interests. The Majority Plan as handed down not only had something about it of the nature of a judicial decree but, after each new noisy Soviet diatribe, was wielded as if it were an ultimatum rather than a set of proposals for negotiation. The all-or-nothing stand of the US delegation, supported (though with unmistakable doubts and misgivings) by the other Western powers, gave the Russians the opportunity, as Chester I. Barnard warned Baruch in the spring of 1946, "to dance up and down indefinitely" on sanctions and other side issues. It remains that inspection is the decisive pivot to the Russians as well as to ourselves.

There have been two general theories in the West explaining the Russian fear of inspection, one political, the other military. The political theory seems to have been dominant in the State Department and among the US delegates to the UNAEC. Frederick H. Osborn, chief US negotiator from 1947 through 1949, and his colleagues, in numerous public utterances and in off-the-record talks, have reiterated this theory. The following excerpt from one of Osborn's speeches is typical:

> The real reasons for the Soviet refusals to accept the majority proposals are quite different from the ostensible reason given to date. For the present, at least, the Soviet Union would rather run the risk of leaving a preponderant strength in this weapon in the hands of others rather than risk opening up the Soviet Union to the extent required by any real system of international control. . . . Apparently the rulers of the Soviet Union do not desire—perhaps do not dare—to raise the iron curtain at this time.

Based on this analysis, Osborn and his colleagues concluded that:

> The Soviet counterproposals seem to the majority pure hypocrisy, an attempt to mislead public opinion rather than to reach a solution.[12]

The military theory, though recognized by the Western powers, has received less public attention and is somewhat more tangible.[13] It argues that opening Russia to international inspection would supply the West with invaluable military information, information otherwise unobtainable; that the Soviet Union does not trust the Western powers and cannot afford to let such data come into their possession. Soviet and satellite spokesmen at the UN have strongly hinted in this direction.[14]

As a minimum precaution, if inspection were permitted, the Russians might wish to insist that long-range bombers, guided missiles and rockets be controlled and limited along with atomic weapons; this suggests itself as one, though certainly not the only, reason why the USSR took the initiative in 1946 in suggesting limitations on conventional armaments.

Another possible explanation for Soviet resistance to international inspection—especially when coupled with an immediate raw-materials survey—may be their reluctance to divulge a relatively poor position with respect to uranium resources. Despite its vast land mass the Soviet Union may not have discovered, indeed may not possess, rich uranium-ore deposits; the US situation, after all, is similar. If Russia is mainly dependent on the uranium resources of Joachimsthal, and if these in turn are limited, the Russian position is so precarious as to make the surrounding facts the closest of defense secrets, far more valuable to American military authorities than any of our secrets, of techniques, production rates and the like, would be to the Russians.

As between these two theories—the political and the military—it is unnecessary to choose one to the exclusion of the other. The political theory is frequently preferred because of its sinister implications, because it jibes with Western political objectives, because it places the USSR in the least favorable light. It is said that the Russian totalitarian system could not survive an influx of foreigners bringing reports of the freedom and prosperity in the West, that if the Iron Curtain were lifted even slightly and the evils lying behind it were exposed to the scrutiny of outsiders (*e.g.*, teams of inspectors) the pressure of outraged world opinion, when added to internal discontent, would blast the Politburo from office. We think this is nonsense. Russian Communism is no tender plant; buttressed by a nationalism which is as strong as any in the world, it is quite capable of withstanding the "subversive" influence of a few hundred inspectors, and not even the Baruch Plan requires that the Soviet Union be opened for every kind of travel and

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traffic with the West. Moreover, no reality could compete with the Soviet horror diet on which the Western world, Americans especially, have been feeding for the past three decades—with some surcease during the war.

Soviet prison camps present a more serious difficulty. There can be no doubt of the existence of this inhuman forced-labor system, though there is a wide range of estimates even among semi-qualified experts—and these are the best we have—as to the number of persons confined to the camps. It is barely possible that the Politburo would feel itself compelled, in the event of international inspection, to improve conditions in the camps. But the forced-labor system has not prevented the Western world from joining with Russia as an ally against Germany, from engaging with her in trade, from admitting her to the UN, or from negotiating over atomic controls. If an atomic convention impelled the Soviets to modify or abandon their camps, so much the better; the real point is that the issue of inspection must be pressed, without side distractions, to determine how far Russia is willing to go. On balance, in a cynical world, it seems as doubtful that the Russians would refuse inspection for fear of being criticized for their prison camps as that we would refuse to accept them as partners in a pact for mutual self-preservation because of their inhumanity.

A few final words on the issue of atomic power may be permitted. It has been widely argued that the Russians would object strongly to a moratorium on atomic power. This would be unfortunate if true, since it would negate the possibility of their acquiescing in the curtailment of plutonium production, which seems the only feasible basis of meeting the problems of production quotas and international ownership. P. M. S. Blackett, in his book, *Fear, War and the Bomb*, made much of the contention that a limitation on the development of atomic power under a control plan would constitute a severe handicap to the expansion of the Soviet economy. The fact is that before Blackett dressed up this argument for them, in a chapter which is logically and factually one of the weakest in his book, the Russians made little of the point themselves; since the publication of the book in England in October, 1948, Soviet and satellite spokesmen have quoted Blackett directly, as well as paraphrased him, especially in the 1948 and 1949 UN Assembly debates.[15, 16]

As we have seen, the argument has little substance. (See Section III, Technical Handbook.) Atomic power on a significant scale is at least one or two decades off and is, so far as can now be judged, of dubious economic advantage; Russia is well supplied with conventional fuels and water power (though many resources remain to be developed); and without international control atomic reactors will be used primarily for plutonium production for weapons and certainly not for power. The Russians may continue to make propaganda speeches around Blackett's point, but their position is untenable and, as the record suggests, it is not one which they take too seriously.*

2. *United States.* How would the US and its North Atlantic Pact allies react to our proposed modification of the majority UN control plan? In general, we have already discussed the Western position with respect to each of the major provisions of the plan and can dispose of the question briefly. It is conceivable that concessions would be made on sanctions, "stages" and international ownership, and it is appropriate that such concessions be made since the majority proposals on these issues rest on unsupportable assumptions. Inspection for clandestine activities, as the key to security, would and should be the area of least compromise. Whether the US would itself be prepared to submit to the kind of inspection now demanded of the Russians is not, in our opinion, clear. For the moment we enjoy the comfortable position of having made an unacceptable but morally unobjectionable offer to the Russians. It has not been necessary for us, therefore, to give much thought to what the weightier segments of American power and opinion would do if the Russians were suddenly to accept the Majority Plan intact and the US were faced with the prospect of roving foreign inspectors in Los Alamos, Kansas City, Washington and North Platte; with aerial surveys, and the dismantling of plants; with the surrender of bombs, fissionables and *secrets*. This is a side of the atomic problem to remember when mutual concessions are up for discussion.

But much more important is the question brought into the open by the London *Economist* (February 4, 1950) and by Senator Tydings earlier this year. *Is it to the interest of the West to have plutonium and hydrogen bombs controlled, while leaving other armaments and armed forces uncontrolled, specifically the Red Army, Air Force and Submarine Fleet?* If one assumes, as Churchill did,

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* An example of the kind of illiterate nonsense which has been used on this point, and has gone virtually unchallenged in the UN debate, is the following, by a member of the Polish delegation:

"Mankind knows that atomic energy may be used right now in a very practical way for the progress of civilization. Of course this does not let Mr. Morgan, and other industrial bigwigs, sleep—people who are afraid of seeing electric power become obsolete through the use of the cheaper sources of atomic energy, and therefore artificially try to stop progress in this field" (November 23, 1949, A/PV/234, p. 66).

Atomic power is, of course, a source of electric power and cannot therefore make electric power obsolete. Nor has it been demonstrated that electric power from atomic energy would be any cheaper than from coal, oil, gas or water-power; and even if it should ultimately prove to be so, the investments in present power-generating facilities would be only slightly affected, and would probably have long since been depreciated. Atomic reactors would, on the most optimistic assumptions, substitute only gradually for fuel-fired steam boilers and hydro dams, leaving entirely unaffected the major part of the capital outlay represented by the electric-power-distribution systems.

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that without the US atom-bomb monopoly the Red Army would by now have occupied all of continental Europe, the answer is obviously "no."* Even without taking this extreme position, it would appear to be of vital concern to the West to strive not only for atomic controls, but simultaneously—almost as a precondition to such controls—for a general and sweeping disarmament convention. The Russians have apparently grasped the importance of this fact more clearly than have our official representatives. They have even been somewhat puzzled over our exclusive preoccupation with the danger of atomic weapons at a time when we held a monopoly and were advised that we would continue to hold it for many years. Atomic controls are merely a part of disarmament; to permit submarines, aircraft, bacteriological warfare, rockets, large armies, to remain undisturbed is as if the penal code were to pronounce only as to train robbers and were silent as to other offenses.

A fresh approach to the problem of atomic controls can scarcely afford to evade these considerations. Russia's legitimate fear of the West is largely based on US military preparations, atomic weapons and the promised hydrogen bomb among them. The US' legitimate fears are based on Russia's military preparations, including not only atomic weapons but the increasing might of the Red Army and submarine fleet. The most obvious solvent of these mutual fears, the way to overcome Russia's resistance to adequate inspection and the US' resistance to modifying certain of the provisions of the Majority Plan, is to achieve a general disarmament agreement. The willingness to negotiate on this basis is the test of the sincerity of peaceful aims. If the deadlock is to be broken, only a bold stroke along this broad front offers the possibility of success.

In considering the prospect of fresh negotiations which, we feel confident, will be undertaken, there are a number of basic truths to be kept in the forefront of thought. They include the following:

1. Absolute security is unattainable. The American people have been misled, either to believe that building weapons of ever increasing power can assure their safety, or that the UN Majority Plan for atomic controls, if accepted by the Russians, would do so. To argue that the hydrogen bomb furthers peace and security is to make words utterly meaningless. Even genocidal weapons are no exception to the rule that the expansion of a nation's military force increases rather than diminishes the likelihood of conflict. In such a conflict there can be no question of victory; nations will not survive; life itself may be erased from the earth. As for the Baruch-UN plan, it is unnecessary to say more than that a plan never fully worked out and with no chance of acceptance by either side is no plan, and offers no security. To speculate regarding its effectiveness if it had been accepted is to indulge in fantasies—in this case an enervating as well as a dangerous pastime.

2. Will the Russians abide by any agreement they may make? Answer: We don't know, nor does anyone else. Questions of this kind are usually asked in order to serve as a platform for a carefully prepared harangue. Whether or not the Russians have breached agreements in the past, the possibility remains that they may live up to future agreements; and if an adequate control system, giving warning of violations, were adopted, even if the Russians were to abandon it after a short time, the US would be no worse off than it is now. The Russians have had a most costly experience in the last war; they are not likely to wish to repeat it on an even more catastrophic scale. Most careful students of Soviet politics and doctrine doubt that world domination through military aggression is the inevitable goal of Communism.[17]

The essential point is that the viability of an atomic-control system will be determined by the mutual faith accompanying its adoption—not so much a faith in other nations and in the integrity of their leaders, for one may doubt that "faith" in this immediate and personal sense has any real validity with respect to relations among nations, as a faith based upon the mutual advantage of a course of common action. Only agreements that serve self-interest will live; as the ordinary personal ethic does not bind the sovereign, so the yardsticks by which personal dealings are measured do not fit the state. The past has shown that nations will do what they will do; the high prudence of self-preservation dictates the search for a road they can travel together with the least cost and the greatest common benefit.

3. If the mutual aim is peace, ways can be found to prevent war; if the aim is war (or if men adopt a pessimistic philosophy of inevitableness), neither conventions nor devices can avert war. Disarmament and atomic controls are neither the final nor perhaps even the first moves toward peace. A joint declaration by the heads of Britain, Russia and the US that so far from regarding war as inevitable, they hold the continued peaceful coexistence of their countries as indispensable to human survival; a treaty outlawing the use of weapons of mass destruction; an offer of economic aid without Baruch Plan strings attached—these are among the possible steps that could precede or accompany renewed negotiations for atomic controls. It is the crux of the matter to realize that an atomic-energy agreement, for all its intrinsic importance, is primarily significant because it is an *agreement*, and second, because it deals with atomic energy. Whether it promises peace or merely an armistice, world government or balance of power, is impossible to say.

*Senator Tydings, chairman of the Military Affairs Committee and member of the Foreign Relations and Joint Atomic Energy Committees, stated flatly that the US Senate would not ratify an atomic-control treaty alone, *i.e.*, without other disarmament provisions (the *Congressional Record*, February 23, 1950, pp. 2293-2296).

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What can be said is that it signifies the disposition to settle jointly what cannot be settled individually. In that mood, international problems can be solved; nothing less will do.

The supreme issue is peace. We must do what can be done to preserve it. This means new ideas and new measures: better measures than hydrogen bombs, better ideas than standing by the Baruch Plan or "meeting strength with strength." (Clausewitz and Moltke and Haushofer are fortunately quite dead and should not be resuscitated as apostles of American foreign policy.) It is never too late to resign ourselves to world suicide; meanwhile we had best spend our energy and resources on more rational ventures.

Footnotes

[1]"Middle-Run Planning: Atomic Energy and International Relations," in *Technology and International Relations*, William F. Ogburn, ed., Chicago, 1949.

[2]AEC/C.1/PV/p. 35.

[3]US Atomic Energy Commission; *Fifth Semi-Annual Report*, Washington, January, 1949, pp. 5–7; same, *Prospecting for Uranium*, Washington, 1949; Bureau of Mines, Canada, *Prospectors' Guide for Uranium and Thorium Minerals in Canada*, Ottawa, 1948.

[4]Committee on Atomic Energy of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *A Conference Report on International Inspection of Radioactive Mineral Production*, New York, February, 1946.

[5]UN 1948 General Assembly. Osborn; A/C.1/A-III/SR/4, p. 3; Austin; A/C.1/SR/162, p. 3.

[6]Compare the last chapter of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report and Baruch's UN address of June 14, 1946. Also Chester Barnard in *Scientific American*, November, 1949. A US War Department paper submitted to the Library of Congress and published in May, 1947, estimated the length of the transition stages, before final relinquishment by the US of its stockpile of bombs, at five years. Brodie and Galloway, *The Atomic Bomb and the Armed Services*, Library of Congress, Washington, May, 1947, p. 68.

[7]AEC/C.1/PV/24, pp. 43-45.

[8]US Department of State press release, April 9, 1946.

[9]United Nations, *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, January, 1950, p. 2.

[10]D. F. Cavers, "New Life for the UNAEC," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, December, 1948, p. 356 *et seq.*

[11]C. Daniel and J. L. Balderston, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, January, 1950, p. 17.

[12]"Communist Premises, Methods, and Organization Deny the Possibility of Coöperative Agreement," speech at Wellesley Conference, July 1, 1948, in *Atomic Impasse*, a collection of speeches by Frederick Osborn, US Department of State publication No. 3272, Washington, September, 1948. See also: "Foreign Observer": "Russia, the United States and the Atom," *Atlantic Monthly*, April, 1948.

[13]*Cf.* "Foreign Observer," *op. cit.*

[14]"The American plan would call for inspection of all the resources of a country and this would make it possible to obtain a complete picture of military objectives in any country, and to build up a network of military and industrial espionage. Under the present circumstances, the Soviet Union must consider it very important to keep secret the location of Soviet military enterprises"—Vishinsky, address to UN General Assembly, November 23, 1949.

[15]1948, A/C.1 SR/163; A/SR/156.

[16]1949, A/PV/253, 254.

[17]*Cf.* George F. Kennan, "Is War with Russia Inevitable?," *Reader's Digest*, April, 1950.

THE WEEK

A CHANCE FOR LABOR UNITY

A plan for labor unity, initiated by Philip Murray, at last seems to stand some chance of adoption. Murray has invited all branches of organized labor to join with the CIO in establishing a "united labor committee" to "coördinate our efforts in the economic, legislative and political spheres" and later to seek "the organic unity of all American labor."

It is on the point of "organic unity" that previous discussions between the AFL and CIO have foundered. The most recent negotiations, three years ago, came to an impasse when the CIO refused to consider a full merger and the AFL refused to consider any unity moves short of actual merger. The times have softened both attitudes. "The economic policies being pursued by the small financial group that dominates American industry will inevitably result in a disastrous depression" unless "organized labor, acting unitedly," seeks and obtains effective governmental action, Murray said in his letter to the other union heads. "The powerful industrialists and their reactionary spokesmen in Congress dare to defeat the people's will because they sense, and take advantage of, the lack of unity . . . in the councils of organized labor. . . . The economic situation, the legislative impasse, and political realities call for common action on our part—now."

Because he feels this urgency so strongly, Murray is even willing to agree, in deference to the AFL's views, that "organic unity . . . is the desirable goal to which we all aspire." On the AFL's part, William Green and others in the leadership have grown more aware of the need for coöperation as they have become deeply involved in political action. Most of the jurisdictional problems between the AFL and the CIO concerned the left-wing unions which have now been expelled from the CIO. Labor bureaucrats will have no cause to oppose Murray's proposal. "The framework of our existing organizational structures" would not be touched at present. The vast improvement in present affairs would come in establishment of a standing committee, with authority to act for the groups it represented, which would "embark upon and pursue a common program . . . in the economic, legislative and political spheres."

John L. Lewis has already pledged the United Mine Workers to join in the move. The railroad brotherhoods and the Independent Machinists are understood to be agreeable. The AFL will be decisive. Sentiment in its high command is for giving the plan a trial. Months of negotiation are sure to precede so drastic a step, but there is reason to hope that before the next Congress convenes, labor will be prepared to work for a common program.

THE DP BILL AT LAST

In a remarkable midnight session the Senate finally passed a liberalized displaced-persons bill, long promised by the Administration. By a vote of 49 to 25, the Kilgore bill was adopted as a substitute for the one offered by Patrick A. McCarran's (D, Nev.) Judiciary Committee.

During the 12-hour debate, the Senate waded through some 137 amendments. Senator McCarran himself sponsored 50, and demanded roll calls on many of them, in an attempt to force through the discriminatory provisions in his committee's bill. The Kilgore forces defeated the McCarran amend-

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ments one by one, many of them by only a small margin: to restore the 40-percent quota for the Balts (45-39); to change the definition of displaced persons and make eight million Germans eligible under the program (48-37); to halt the DP program whenever unemployment should exceed four million, as it does now (61-17); to revise the administrative procedures of the DP Commission (42-41). Aligned with McCarran were most of the Southern Democrats and many Midwestern Republicans, but they failed to win a single major roll-call vote.

Senator Harley Kilgore (D, W. Va.) was a masterful floor leader. On the vote to substitute his bill for McCarran's, 25 Democrats and 24 Republicans voted with Kilgore; 11 Democrats and 14 Republicans opposed him. The Kilgore bill, almost identical to the one passed by the House last year, extends the DP program for one year beyond June 30 and raises the number of DPs to be admitted under the program to 344,000, in addition to 54,744 expellees of German ethnic origin and 20,000 non-quota war orphans. The Senate bill eliminates the "quota" restrictions under which 40 percent of all DPs had to be Balts and 30 percent farmers (a restriction President Truman had called discrimination against Jews and Catholics). It gives the Immigration Service and the State Department final authority in determining both the eligibility and admissibility of DPs. The cut-off date for determining the eligibility was advanced from December 22, 1945, to January 1, 1949.

THE WASHINGTON POST

"We ain't giving no information to no foreigners."

HARRY BRIDGES

For the fourth time in thirteen years, Harry Bridges' relationship to the Communist Party has been subjected to legal review. This time, a jury has decided that he was a Communist in 1945, when he swore that he was not, and thereby obtained naturalization. The trial lasted 85 days; the jury was out for a total elapsed time of almost four days. Found guilty with Bridges were two co-defendants who had been character witnesses in his naturalization hearings. Because of their actions in the courtroom, Federal Judge George B. Harris found his counsel and associate counsel guilty of contempt of court, and sentenced them to six and three months in prison respectively.

The jury presumably gave great weight to the testimony of John H. Schomaker and other confessed former Communists, who testified that Bridges was a card-carrying, dues-paying member of the Party.

Bridges, born in Australia, came to the United States as a sailor in 1920 and jumped ship. He played an important role in the great San Francisco water-front strike in 1934. In 1937, the Immigration Department reviewed the question whether he was a member of an organization "pledged to overthrow the government by force and violence," and he was cleared. In 1939 Dean James M. Landis of the Harvard Law School acted as special examiner and again cleared him. In 1941, Judge Charles B. Sears reviewed the evidence, and found against him; the case went to the US Supreme Court, which ruled in Bridges' favor.

Bridges' counsel have already announced that they will seek either a new trial or an appeal, and since the matter is thus still *sub judice*, public judgment on the outcome should be reserved. Bridges' counsel have made grave charges against the conduct of the trial by Judge Harris, which will certainly be reviewed if an appeal is taken. Inevitably, the case has important political overtones. Bridges and his friends say he is being railroaded because he is an able, aggressive union leader; the conservatives insist, on the contrary, that his Communist affiliations have long been obvious and that he was protected for many years because of influence in high places. By the time the case has been to the Supreme Court again, we shall perhaps know which, if either, of these assumptions is correct.

BLUM'S LAST TESTAMENT

PARIS (NR correspondent)

The Italian government thinks it needs all the trained military officers it can get to prepare for the use of MAP in building up an "Italian legion" in the military crusade against Communism. There are still some Italian officers, including generals, in Soviet prisoner-of-war camps. They have the right kind of training because they led the "Fascist legion" Mussolini sent to Russia to destroy Communism by force of arms. To get these men, the Italian government seems willing to pay any price. Last month 32 men were taken from a refugee camp in Southern Italy and delivered to the Soviet government. It was nominally a prisoner-of-war exchange, though the men were refugees, not prisoners. The men were Ukrainians and Balts, all anti-Communist. Obviously they were being sent to torture and death.

Early in March word got around in the refugee camps at Fraschete and San Antonio in Southern Italy that the Soviets were pressing for further "exchanges" and that the Italians were willing. Shortly after, 52 Balts and Ukrainians started a hunger strike, preferring to die in Italy than to be given to the Soviets. All 52 were known anti-Communists. The Soviets said they were war criminals. In fact, the Italians had investigated the charges against them and found them baseless. Yet, late in

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March, word leaked out from the camps through the anti-Communist underground to Paris that the Italians were preparing to deliver the 52 men.

On March 30 a telegram of protest was sent from Paris to Premier Alcide de Gasperi. "We refuse to believe," the signers said, "that the Italian Government is capable of accepting an inhuman bargain which would expose refugees to the gravest reprisals in order to obtain the return of Italian prisoners illegally kept by the Soviet Union. We ask assurances that the fate of the refugees will be decided in accordance with the elementary principles of justice and humanity."

The message was signed by André Gide, the Nobel-Prize-winning novelist; Albert Camus, the best of the younger French writers; Claude Bourdet, famous journalist; François Mauriac, France's leading Catholic writer; the Reverend Father Riquet, a Catholic priest; and by Léon Blum.

It was the last act of the grand old man of French and European Socialism. He died several hours after putting his name on the message, which turned out to be the crowning symbol of more than half a century of striving for "the elementary principles of justice and humanity."

THE ADA CONVENTION

The Americans for Democratic Action, in their third annual convention, appeared to be a vigorous and healthy group. The 651 delegates to the national meeting in Washington listened proudly to the reports of their officers: that today there is at least a beginning of ADA organization in three-fourths of the states; that there are 35,000 regular members and 120 chapters; and that 10,000 students for Democratic Action have formed another 150 campus groups. Three thousand new members have joined in the last year. Forty ADA-ers are now serving in the House; seven, in the Senate.

Confidence that the organization will continue to flourish was high, but there was also general uncertainty as to the exact role the ADA should play in the future. In the keynote address, Chester Bowles of Connecticut argued that the ADA might serve best by becoming an American counterpart to the British Fabian Society. "An even more important contribution . . . than political action . . . is to provide the intellectual leadership which today is so badly needed. . . . In my opinion, political action will be far better left to the Democratic Party and the political-action committees of labor."

Very few delegates agreed. More direct action, not less, was what the convention had in mind. But the agenda of the meeting was short on practical discussion. The ADA is not yet truly organization-minded.

Sentiment was strong for independence of the major parties. Over the opposition of most of its leaders, the ADA convention loosened even more the tie that has bound it lightly to the Fair Deal Administration. The convention ruled that the ADA should act as a goad in the side of the Democratic Party, and also as the champion of bold actions which neither of the major parties can espouse.

Beyond this, the ADA's role remains unclear. Its founders visualized it as the means for bringing together the AFL and the CIO and uniting farm organizations and unions with liberal intellectuals. Progress in this direction has not been marked. Labor has not been willing to treat the ADA as an equal partner in liberalism. Aside from Walter Reuther and David Dubinsky, few important union leaders are much concerned with the ADA. Not a single one of the top farm leaders attended the convention.

The reaction of the CIO-PAC to all overtures toward closer relations with the ADA has been, broadly, that the ADA should spend its energy on organizing liberals outside the labor movement. The suspicion remains among union leaders as well as Democratic politicians that ADA intellectuals have some sinister design on them or their fat bankrolls.

Plans for next year are being laid on a realistic basis. The meager funds available for organizing will be concentrated in a few places at a time. The immediate focus will be on Indiana and Michigan. Emphasis for the November elections will be on the comparatively few districts in which the ADA has considerable influence. The aim is to make the ADA's organization the equal of its oratory.

THE BINAGGIO CASE

Who killed Charles Binaggio, Kansas City gambler and political boss? Among all the suggested answers, the most remarkable was that of Representative Dewey Short (R, Mo.)—so remarkable it is hard to believe it represented his sober judgment. Binaggio, he told the House of Representatives, was shot because he was bucking President Truman in a primary campaign.

Binaggio was a tough young North Sider who moved into the empty space in Kansas City politics vacated by old Tom Pendergast. In 1948 he arranged that several hundred thousand dollars of gamblers' money should be spent to elect Democrats to state offices. Kansas City and the state of Missouri were to be opened up for gambling in return. But the Kansas City *Star* and the St. Louis *Post-Dispatch* broke up the play. Instead, a federal jury moved in against Binaggio. When the word went out that the Feds were after him, he fell fast.

A lot of people stood to lose if Binaggio talked to the grand jury. The national syndicate of gamblers is known to have its own methods of dealing with members who become inconvenient. Whoever did the killing, nobody in the United States—not even Senator McCarthy—rose last week to second Short in his fantastically irresponsible charge.

MASS TREASON

A footnote to history was written last week by the French Communist Party. At its annual congress, the Party told its members to do everything possible to sabotage French efforts in any future war with the Soviet Union. The Communists, masters of semantics, did not put it quite so bluntly, but their meaning was plain. They refused to "make or transport" arms for atomic war.

If there is any historic parallel for this development, in which masses of citizens announce in advance that they are trying to weaken their own country in order to help a potential enemy, we cannot recall it. Yet the action is not surprising; the French Communists have long been moving in this direction. Since the influence of the Party appears, on the whole, to be waning, the threat to the North Atlantic Pact is not likely to be a fatal one.

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OUTSIDE AMERICA

Italy needs all the money Dean Acheson and Paul Hoffman can get Congress to give—this year and probably for years to come. Italy should get the money. From the standpoint of democracy and security, it's in America's interest to give the money. But if "the Kremlin's design is to be frustrated" by its use, the American people had better keep an eye on how the Italian government spends it.

The record of the first two years of ECA spending inside Italy isn't good. On the contrary, it's very bad. Acheson can talk about building "a functioning political and economic society of free nations," he can call for creating "a spiritual and material base" essential "to the preservation of the integrity of our way of life," but ECA money in the past hasn't been used to give the Italians themselves a society that functions freely, justly, or well. In large areas of the country the Italians are farther away from anything faintly resembling the American material way of life than they were before Washington started to try to frustrate the Kremlin's design.

Basil Davidson of the London *New Statesman*, a much traveled man who knows Italy intimately, made a trip to some of these areas and found:

> The south of Italy can arouse only feelings of shame and revulsion. . . . There is more misgovernment here than anywhere else in Europe. . . . It is not enough to say that the provinces of the south and of Sicily and Sardinia are backward. . . . They are in fact retreating, and at a fairly rapid speed, into ever deeper poverty and ruin. . . . Just as an end to Italian unemployment of industrial labor and machinery depends upon structural reform against the selfish interests of the owners of industry, so does an end to unemployment of the land and the peasants depend upon reform against the interests of the landowners.

This diagnosis isn't Davidson's alone. It is shared by all honest observers who get away from the Roman official set and really use their own eyes and ears and hearts in the countryside. Things are bad in Italy after two years of ECA. And the tragedy is that, unless the American people demand a democratic return for their investment in Italy, they are likely to get worse.

Perhaps it was proper that Acheson and Hoffman didn't bother Congress with details about the Italian government which is to spend the money for the third year of ECA. But American liberals might well look at recent evidence that Premier Alcide de Gasperi seems to disagree with the diagnosis made by impartial observers of Italy's needs. He recently formed his sixth government. There's a new Minister of Industry. His name is Togni, and he's a director of Montecatini, the largest chemical trust in the country, one of a dozen or so huge combines which monopolize the nation's industry more tightly now than under Mussolini. There's also a new Minister of Public Works, Aldisio, a reactionary Catholic from Sicily, who speaks for the great landowners of the south. And the holdovers in the sixth government include the most reactionary men of the fifth: for example, there's Pella, Minister of the Budget, whose economic liberalism is well to the Right of Herbert Hoover's; and Scelba, Minister of the Interior, another Sicilian reactionary, whose notions of public order are neolithic.

The influence of the reactionaries was plainly shown in the first press conference de Gasperi held after the formation of the government. He announced what the New York *Herald Tribune* called "a broad plan of reforms to combat the misery in Italy." But when he got down to cases, he admitted that the really progressive steps toward land reform—such as the restriction of private holdings to about three square miles—would not be taken. The "broad plan" was nothing more than another modification of the government-supported Segni bill. This is only slightly better than the De Martino bill, offered by the great *latifundisti* themselves, which gets the state to give funds for capital investment which the landowners themselves are unwilling to give—and without any honest expropriation of land. The latest version of the Segni bill bases land "reform" on taxable value instead of territorial size; and the landowners' lawyers can "fix" values as they wouldn't be able to twist surveyors' figures.

Such a suggestion of what de Gasperi considers a progressive measure is ominous in view of the fact that the men who might have offered some show of resistance to removing the last traces of democracy are missing from the government which is to spend the third annual installment of ECA money. Tremelloni, the anti-Communist Saragat Socialist, refused to stay because, he said, the new cabinet wouldn't "carry out the minimum of social policy" required to justify any kind of Socialist participation. Fanfani, Minister of Labor in the fifth de Gasperi cabinet, isn't in the sixth either.

His absence is the most significant development in Italian governmental politics since the election of April, 1948, won for the anti-Communist forces with large-scale help by the Vatican and the American government. For Fanfani is of the progressive wing of de Gasperi's own Christian Democratic Party. With his departure, the final obstacle to the triumph of the big reactionary industrialists and landowners is gone.

The left wing of the Christian Democrats is led by Deputy Dossetti and includes among its leaders Deputies Gronchi, Lazzati and Rapelli. Until recently it worked in close coöperation with progressive elements in the Catholic Action. This is the organization which, through 40,000 civic committees, brought out 13 million votes and elected 305 Christian Democratic deputies in the 1948 election.

Dossetti, on behalf of about one-fourth of the total membership of the party, called on de Gasperi for two places in the sixth government. These were to be the Ministry of Industry, as a means of bringing the ideas of a planned economy to bear on the drive toward economic liberalism (which of course means ultra-conservatism); and the Ministry of Labor, as a means of keeping the government in touch with the democratic needs of the people.

De Gasperi's refusal and the resulting withdrawal of the progressives mark another step in the Italian government's steady march away from the principles of democracy and social jus-

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tice. Until last year, de Gasperi, as the head of a centrist group including Cappi, Taviani and Piccioni, kept a balance between the leftists and an extreme rightist group led by Jacini and Reggio d'Acl. The violently reactionary ideas set forth in the weekly *Realta Politica* were balanced by the mildly New Deal ideas in *Cronache Sociali* and *Politica Sociale*. At the party's third national congress in Venice last June, the progressives gained some ground, but not enough to check the rightist trend.

For *Realta Politica* sought and obtained the Vatican's support for the thesis that any kind of planned economy and any real land reform were nothing but Communism. De Gasperi saw the light and followed it. Luigi Gedda, who had guided the civic committees toward liberalism, was shelved. Progressives lost heart and left the Catholic Action. To those who know Italian politics, Dossetti's futile effort to stop the march toward the Right shows clearly that, unless American liberals put strings on ECA dollars for Italy, the cause of Italian democracy and social justice must be considered lost.

One man in Italy understands how the effect of this disaster on the Italian masses can be exploited. He is Pietro Nenni, leader of the Socialists who work with the Communists. Knowing that the Italian masses are aware of the Vatican's part in the political drift, knowing how they feel about the way ECA money will be misspent, he has called for a revision of the Lateran Pact, the Concordat between the Vatican and the Italian State.

There won't, of course, be any revision. But the Communists will profit by the demand for it. And the purpose of frustrating the Kremlin's design in Italy will not have been served by an Italian government that can do as it chooses (and does badly) with a blank check from America. PERCY WINNER

LATTIMORE STRIKES BACK

EDITORS' NOTE: *Owen Lattimore was representing America on a UN mission to Afghanistan when Senator Joseph R. McCarthy (R, Wis.) called him "the top Russian espionage agent in the United States." On April 6, before a crowded Senate hearing, Lattimore struck back. His statement, delivered with quiet intensity, was a point-by-point refutation of McCarthy's charges, an outspoken attack on McCarthy's spirit of ignorant bigotry and an eloquent reaffirmation of an approach that may yet save Asia for the Free World. Excerpts from his statement are reprinted below:*

To me, the honor and responsibility of American citizenship carry with them an obligation to respect the high office of a member of the United States Senate. But that office, the position of United States Senator, likewise carries with it a responsibility which Joseph McCarthy has flagrantly violated. As a citizen who holds no official position, it is my right and duty to list these violations which are illustrated by the Senator's conduct in my own case.

He has violated it by impairing the effectiveness of the United States Government in its relations with its friends and allies, and by making the Government of the United States an object of suspicion in the eyes of the anti-Communist world, and undoubtedly the laughingstock of the Communist governments.

He has violated it by instituting a reign of terror among officials and employees in the United States Government, no one of whom can be sure of safety from attack by the machine gun of irresponsible publicity in Joseph McCarthy's hands.

He has without authorization used secret documents obtained from official government files.

He has vilified citizens of the United States and accused them of high crime, without giving them an opportunity to defend themselves.

He has refused to submit alleged documentary evidence to a duly constituted committee of the Senate.

He has invited disrespect to himself and his high office by refusing to live up to his word. Twice on the floor of the Senate he stated that any charges that he made under the cloak of immunity, he would repeat in another place so that their falseness could be tested in a court of the United States. He said that if he should fail to do this he would resign. He has been called to repeat his charges so that they could be tested in a court action. He has failed to do so. And he has not resigned.

I speak to you as a private citizen. I owe no obligation to anyone except my country and my conscience. I have spent my life in the study of the problems of the Far East, and, as an author and journalist, in writing about those problems as I saw them. I have written eleven books, and literally hundreds of newspaper and magazine articles. Too few people in this country have realized the importance of the Far East—of China, Mongolia, Tibet, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan. These areas of the world seem to most Americans to be merely places in a travel book. I have been trying all my life to arouse interest in this area and to spread knowledge of it in this country.

Now, suddenly, this nation is beginning to awaken to the fact that the Far East may be a center of the political crisis in which we find ourselves. That is a hopeful development. From this awakening, public debate is bound to result; and through public debate, the nation should be able to evolve policies toward China and the Far East which we will carry out in the same spirit of patriotic nonpartisanship which has, until recently, distinguished our conduct of foreign affairs in Europe.

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But before this essential public debate on China policy can take place, there are some things that have to be cleared away.

First, it is possible for people, including officials of the United States Government, to oppose further aid to the Nationalist Government of China without being disloyal to the United States, or pro-Communist.

Second, persons, including officials, who opposed further aid to the Nationalist Government—or who advocated a reduction of that aid, after the end of the war with Japan—were not necessarily disloyal to the United States or pro-Communist.

Third, citizens of the United States, including State Department officials engaged on Far Eastern work, are presumptively loyal and devoted to their country.

Fourth, persons who are engaging in violent propaganda for all-out aid to the Nationalist Government in Formosa and to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek do not have a monopoly of opposition to Communism. . . .

Now, it is obvious that Senator McCarthy and I differ on each of these points.

. . . I can understand why the Senator wants to weasel, particularly in view of his brave—but I fear insincere—statements that he would stand or fall on my case. . . . But I think that I would be the instrument of a great service to the country if the Senator should resign, and I want to deal with each of his charges.

At the outset . . . I should like to make clear just what my connections with the State Department and the United States Government have been. The fact is that I have and have had no connection with the Department and the Department does not consult me and has not consulted me, except as follows:

I was appointed by the President as a member of the Pauley Reparations Mission to Japan. . . .

I participated in a two-day panel discussion of China problems at the State Department in October of 1949. . . .

On June 5, I lectured on Japanese problems at the State Department. . . .

Other than this, I have never been a consultant for the State Department or on its payroll.

I do not have a desk in the State Department. I do not have a telephone there. I do not have—and never have had—access to State Department files. The Senator must know that these statements of his are untrue, but it is typical of him that the last time he repeated this silly charge he phrased it in a way that would do credit to the most devious of Communist propagandists. This is what he said on page 4447 of the *Congressional Record*: "Whether or not the Secretary of State will ever admit that Lattimore has a desk in the State Department is comparatively unimportant."—Now, gentlemen, I suggest that that kind of language is not made in Wisconsin. . . .

I want to deal with Senator McCarthy's charge that I am the top Russian espionage agent in this country. As I have said, the Senator has backed away from this accusation and would probably prefer that it be forgotten. But I don't want it to be forgotten that the Senator made the charge. It is an accusation of a base crime, the crime of obtaining and supplying secret information to a foreign nation. In his entire four-hour speech, in which he has dredged up and slung at me all the mud that he could accumulate from all sources, however polluted, McCarthy does not recite a single act or circumstance which even on its face supports this vile accusation.

The nearest he comes to any attempt specifically to charge me with being a Soviet agent is to refer to a trip that I made to Point Barrow, Alaska, in May of 1949. He says that I had two cameras with me on that trip, and that I have a room in Baltimore devoted to "special photographic equipment." Then he adds, with sinister implications—I quote—that "it would be interesting to know where the pictures are today which Lattimore took with those two cameras."

Now, Senators, I did go to Point Barrow. I went there as alternate for the President of Johns Hopkins University, to attend a meeting of the Arctic Research Laboratory Advisory Board. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss research work being done there by various universities under Navy grant. As I recall, one of the projects which I studied and reported on while I was there, concerned the archeological and dendrochronological research which was under way. The minutes of this . . . meeting at Point Barrow are not classified.

I confess that I had a camera—just one. . . . I took a lot of pictures. I didn't get around to developing them until Senator McCarthy made his charges. The pictures and the negatives and Kodachrome slides are right here and I am glad to let you have them. . . .

I hope that you will enjoy the pictures of Eskimo children, dog sleds, huts lined with whaleribs, natural beauties and sunsets. If any of you have any suggestions as to how I can be a better amateur photographer I would appreciate your letting me know. . . .

Lattimore then dealt with the further charges made by McCarthy. He showed that these charges originated with an ex-Communist, Freda Utley, whom he described as a one time Russian agent, and with the China lobby, led by Alfred Kohlberg and William Goodwin, a registered agent of Chiang Kai-shek. This attack, he showed, was only part of a larger assault aimed at the Institute of Pacific Relations, an organization led by many distinguished Americans and described by the Rockefeller Foundation as "the most important single source of independent studies of the problems of the Pacific area and the Far East."

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The Soviet Union, Lattimore added, had denied him travel facilities, had described him as "an American falsifier," a "learned lackey of imperialism," and had commented that "Mr. Lattimore's scholasticism is similar to Hamlet's madness." Lattimore, in reply to McCarthy's charge of Communist Party membership, told the Senators on his "solemn oath":

I am not and never have been a member of the Communist Party. I have never been affiliated or associated with the Communist Party. I have never believed in the principles of Communism nor subscribed to nor advocated the Communist or Soviet form of government either within the United States, in China, in the Far East, or anywhere in the world. I have never consciously or deliberately advocated or participated in promoting the cause of Communism anywhere in the world.

. . . For many years, I have been the subject of the usual type of Communist abuse and hostile Soviet action. . . . Senator McCarthy's characterization of my writings, his summaries and quotations, are sufficiently perverse and twisted to make my Communist critics green with envy. . . .

But . . . not even Senator McCarthy's criticism will prevent me from stating the facts and my views with all the honesty and vigor of which I am capable.

We face a crisis in Asia as well as in Europe. Our . . . lack of a united policy, and of a strong, determined push to effectuate that policy, has resulted in the loss of China to the Communists, at least for the time being.

No man can state with absolute assurance what the future holds with respect to China. Various alternatives are apparent: First, some people still think it is conceivable that the Nationalist Government in Formosa may reconquer China from the Communists. Second, it is possible that a middle-of-the-road or democratic group in China not necessarily part of the Nationalist Government—those whom General Marshall rightly called "a splendid group of men"—can still maintain their strong position in the confidence of the Chinese people unless we drive them completely into the hands of the Communists. Third, it is possible that the Chinese Communists will establish a regime which is Communist but substantially independent of the Soviet Union—what people loosely call Titoism. Fourth, it is possible that the Chinese Communist Government will be drawn more and more completely into the orbit of the Soviet Union and will become a satellite state.

There is one thing, and perhaps only one thing, that is perfectly clear. That is, that the fourth possibility—namely, complete and absolute absorption in fact of China by the Soviet Union—would be an unrelieved catastrophe for the United States and for the Chinese people. That means that our national policy must be to do everything that we can to bring about one of the other possibilities that I have stated. . . .

It is of course not inevitable that the government of the United States should sharply and completely choose one of these alternatives to the complete exclusion of the others. It is possible that policies might be adopted which would be based upon the encouragement of all three of these developments to checkmate the Soviet Union. . . .

I know of nothing that would be more helpful to our nation and our government than full and free debate on this most difficult and vitally important problem. I would myself exclude the first alternative altogether. It is my view that the Nationalist Government in Formosa cannot hope to recapture China, and that the large commitment of United States resources in the Formosa adventure would not merely be wasteful, but would be of positive assistance to the Soviet Union because it would make it possible and perhaps inevitable for the Chinese Communists to invite increased participation of the Soviet Union in the conflict.

Let me illustrate this. As the air assaults increase, with United States planes launched by the Nationalist forces from Formosa upon the mainland of China, there is danger—if it is not already a fact—that the Chinese Communist Government, with the backing of many of the Chinese people, will invite the Soviet Union to establish air bases and to engage actively in the air war. I personally believe that if the Soviet Union establishes air bases in China they will not be dismantled when the Nationalist forces are defeated. To me this is an appalling prospect. To me, this would make it probable if not certain that the die is cast—that the Chinese Government and the Chinese people will be subordinated to the Soviet Union for a long time to come.

Accordingly, it is my view that the major American effort must be in one of the other two directions: namely, to encourage a nationalism, even if it is Communist nationalism, capable of standing up to the Soviet Union and maintaining independence in its dealings with us, or to encourage in every possible way the conditions that will make possible the survival of a so-called third force, a democratic group within China, that can change the character of the government. It seems to me that our long-term objective should clearly be the latter, to build up conditions that favor a democratic group, including such elements of the Kuomintang as may be available and suitable. But it may be that in the short run, while working at this long-term objective, our first objective will have to be to avoid closing the trap on the Chinese. . . .

Now, gentlemen, my analysis of this may be partly or wholly wrong. But if anybody says that it is disloyal or un-American, he is a fool or a knave. But it is exactly this analysis which, I am sure, has provoked the current

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attack in which I have been called these preposterous and villainous names that have been uttered by Senator McCarthy.

Senator McCarthy, without, I am sure, knowing what he is about, has been and is the instrument or the dupe of a bitter and implacable and fanatical group of people who will not tolerate any discussion of China which is not based upon absolute, total and complete support of the Nationalist Government in Formosa. They do not hesitate at—they even insist on—policies that potential allies of ours in India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and other countries will call ruthless imperialism. Their conclusion —that is, that the United States should put all of its eggs in the Nationalist Government's basket—may be right or wrong. I think it's wrong.

But I am *sure* that the methods of that faction of these people who are McCarthy's Edgar Bergen, are wrong—as wrong as wrong can be. Their methods are to intimidate persons like me and even officials of the United States Government from expressing views that are contrary to their own. Their weapon of intimidation is McCarthy's machine gun: namely, accusation of disloyalty and traitorous conduct. I get a certain amount of wry amusement out of the fact that some of these people are acknowledged ex-Communists. Perhaps that status gives them a special right to criticize those of us who do not happen to be Communists, ex- or otherwise. Certainly, it provides them with ideal training and unique skill for the kind of campaign of vilification and distortion that the so-called China Lobby is conducting through the instrumentality of the Senator from Wisconsin.

I do not, by what I have said, want to indicate a feeling of despair about the possibility of democratic success in China. I think I know the Chinese people reasonably well. I have not only great affection, but great admiration for them. Despite the relatively backward state of their country, the Chinese people have a strong and rugged sense of individualism and democracy. If they accept the restraints and repressions of Communism, it will be because they feel that they have no alternative for national and individual survival. If they accept the iron dominion of worldwide Communism, it will be because we, the democratic nations and peoples of the world, have failed. It will be because we, by reason of ignorance or incompetence, have not presented them with an effective choice.

To date, that is exactly what has happened. We have failed in China. Senator McCarthy does me the honor of saying that I am the architect of this policy which has failed. . . .

The fact is that I have never held a position in the United States Government in which I could make policy. The fact is that I have been very little consulted by those who do make policy—before Pearl Harbor, during the war, or since the war. I think I can fairly claim—with great regret—that I am the least consulted man of all those who have a public reputation in this country as specialists on the Far East.

Senator McCarthy has stated that United States Far Eastern policy, and especially China policy, has followed my recommendations "step for step." The record shows the exact opposite to be true. Before the war, I was in favor of a much tougher policy toward Japan than the State Department was willing to follow. During the war, I warned that we must be prepared for a period of very rapid change throughout Asia. No attention was paid to this warning. The last chapters of my book, *Solution in Asia*, published in 1945, a few months before the end of the war, are a crowded catalogue of unaccepted recommendations.

Since the war, my recommendations have had equally little influence on the State Department. The most recent example of this is my memorandum of last August to the State Department committee. . . . In this I warned that we cannot expect to succeed with little Chiang Kai-sheks where we failed with the big Chiang Kai-shek. But we are still supporting a little Chiang Kai-shek in South Korea and we have since taken on another one in Indo-China. I warned that we cannot coerce China by cutting off trade; but by our feeble attitude toward the blockade of Shanghai we have allowed trade to be virtually cut off. I warned that by indecision in recognizing the facts of life in China we were heading for another setback in Asia without even the compensating advantage of hampering Russia's ability to maneuver in Europe; that is exactly what has happened. I warned that reliance on Japan as an instrument of American policy is a bad bet; but Japan is still our most risky bet in Asia. I warned that countries in the Far East must not be made to suspect that the real aim of the United States is to use them against Russia; but all of them are now convinced that this is just what our real aim is.

My recommendations may be right or wrong. I may be accused of having given bad advice by anyone who disagrees with my opinions. What I cannot be accused of is advice that has influenced the policy of the United States in the Far East. I wish that I had in fact had more influence. If I had, I think that the Communists would not now control China.

The very foundation of my views toward China is a firm belief that the United States and the democratic nations of the world—if they are willing to abandon the mistaken policies of the past and face the problems of China and the Far East realistically—can help to bring about the establishment of strong democratic governments in the Far East that will work harmoniously with the Western powers. Despite Senator McCarthy, my books and articles witness that my basic beliefs are the absolute antithesis of the Marxist doctrine. The Communist line as applied to Asia may be easily summed up:

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Capitalism is in decay, and because it is in decay, the European empires are falling apart; capitalist nations in Europe and America are incapable of any non-imperialist relation with these former colonies, which can therefore look for hope only to the Soviet Union.

In my view, this is nonsense. I believe that both capitalism and political democracy have immense vitality and adaptability. If they fail to survive, I believe it will be because of dogmatic or uninformed men who insist on policies of coercion, repression and inequality—not because of inherent defects in capitalism and democracy.

But I want to emphasize with all my heart, that we ourselves, if we are so foolish as to destroy our own democracy, can make the Marxist dream come true. We ourselves can cause the decay of capitalism and democracy. The sure way to do this is to permit the destruction of the basic wellspring from which capitalism and democracy derive their vitality: namely, freedom of research, freedom of speech, and freedom for men stoutly to maintain their diverse opinions.

I say to you, gentlemen, that the sure way to destroy freedom of speech and the free expression of ideas and views is to attach to that freedom the penalty of abuse and vilification. If the people of this country can differ with the so-called China lobby or with Senator McCarthy only at the risk of the abuse to which I have been subjected, freedom will not long survive. If officials of our government cannot consult people of diverse views without exposing themselves to the kind of attack that Senator McCarthy has visited upon officers of the State Department, our governmental policy will necessarily be sterile. It is only from a diversity of views freely expressed and strongly advocated that sound policy is distilled. He who contributes to the destruction of this process is either a fool or an enemy of his country. Let Senator McCarthy take note of this.

THE TERROR IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

by Hugo Skala

THAT THERE IS serious trouble behind the Iron Curtain is now perfectly clear. Moscow obviously fears that the defection of Yugoslavia may be paralleled in greater or less degree in Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Poland. In most of these countries purges are in progress; how thoroughly they are justified, even from Moscow's point of view, we do not know and perhaps shall never know. The Kremlin has treated individuals with cruel injustice in the past and is quite capable of doing so again. Among these purges none has been more severe or, probably, less justified, than that in my own homeland, Czechoslovakia.

To understand the background of this purge one needs to know the underlying economic facts which have had almost no publicity in the United States. The plain truth is that Czechoslovakia today is economically prostrate, because of the actions of the Communists before and after they seized power by a revolutionary coup. Her once flourishing foreign trade has almost disappeared, except for some exchange of products with the other satellite countries, which often results in giving Czechoslovakia goods of inferior quality and of types she does not need or want. When Russia ordered the Czechs to stay out of the Marshall Plan, it was very nearly the final straw. Now she desperately needs a big foreign loan, but her political status is such that she is unlikely to get it.

When Czechoslovakia got back her freedom, in 1945, her economic situation was confused. Hitler had liquidated many of the Jews, and the Czechs, with understandable bitterness, expelled many of the Sudeten Germans, including 2.5 million highly skilled workers. Because of these politics, and through war damage, titles to about two-thirds of industry became unclear, and restitution almost impossible. Even without much attention to ideological motives, nationalization of the large firms seemed a good idea. It was advocated by the Communists, who also persuaded the country to accept a rigid system of national planning.

The Russians were fairly popular at that moment; the Red Army, which had liberated the country from the Germans (the Americans fell back as the result of a high-level policy decision), was used by the Czech Communists for propaganda. The Czechs also asked themselves, what have we got to lose? Their overseas trade had disappeared because of the war, even the trade (40 to 55 percent of the total) with Germany and through Germany to other foreign markets. Raw-material sources were cut off. When the Red Army left, the Czechs indulged in a brief but reckless period of high living; the result was both a squandering of resources and a serious inflation. The two-year plan of the Communists seemed attractive at the time; it was an important factor in their winning 36 percent of the votes in the 1946 election. This was the last free election Czechoslovakia was to have.

But in economic terms, the Communist scheme for a planned economy did not work. In fear of punishment, factory managers speeded up the production of goods, but they ignored both public demand and the problem of quality, which fell so low that soon the shelves were loaded with things people would not buy at any price. When the shops would take no more, the goods simply

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piled up in the factories, which turned into warehouses; there was nobody to turn off the spigot. Goods too bad to be bought at home were, naturally, too bad to send abroad. For policy reasons, the Czechs bought inferior cotton from Russia and India which was woven into fabrics which were unsalable even on the home market, where there was a critical shortage. Being short of iron and steel, the Czechs curtailed their exports of manufactured goods to Poland, in order to divert them to Sweden on a semi-barter basis. Poland threatened reprisal, whereupon the Czechs gave the Poles steel products which had been earmarked for export to the Netherlands. The Netherlands then complained, and was given goods which had been ordered by the Swiss; and so on.

Production, which was based on prewar figures as to demand, could not adjust itself to realistic market requirements. People could not get clothing, paper, linen, furs, furniture, enameled ware, or many other things, even when they had the required ration vouchers. The factories were filled with unfinished heavy machinery unusable because each item lacked a few parts needed from abroad and unobtainable because of the lack of foreign exchange. Billions of bricks deteriorated from rain and frost, while housing construction was at a standstill through the shortage of pipes, steel and timber.

The coal industry was injured by the mild winter of 1947-48, by the resumption of British deliveries to Italy, and by German reparations coal for France. Unsalable Czech coal lay on the ground in heaps and was damaged by the weather. Austria and Italy stopped buying; Switzerland transferred her purchases of coke to Germany. Nevertheless, the mines kept producing like the magic spring of the sorcerer's apprentice: coal was in the plan.

The East European Economic Council of Mutual Assistance is supposed to aid Czechoslovakia; but its resources are limited and its help is a sorry joke. In fact, under Russian direction, it is seeking to merge the Czechoslovak economy with that of Poland. The question can seriously be asked whether Russian policy is not to destroy the Czech economy in toto, in order to make sure that the country will remain subservient to Moscow's aims. It is interesting to note that no Czech has received any war damages or any compensation for the nationalization of his property. Nor has any money been freed, from the billions of crowns that were frozen.

In short, Czechoslovakia's present situation is about as gloomy as could be imagined. There are great stocks of unsalable goods, some of them only partly finished. Raw materials and foreign credits are lacking. Consumer goods are inferior and are bought only out of desperation. The people have lost confidence in the currency; while the legal rate for the crown is two cents, on the black market it is one-tenth of a cent. The ironclad grip of the Czech and Russian Communists prevents all freedom of thought or action; the terror is in full swing. The Czechs are sharing all the miseries of being a part of the Russian system; if there are any advantages, they have yet to discover them.

THE HIGH COURT LOOKS AT JIM CROW

by Charles Thompson

TWO YOUNG AMERICANS, Heman Sweatt and George McLaurin, may soon find out whether they and 12 million other Negroes are first-class or second-class citizens in the eyes of the law. Their cases, now before the Supreme Court, question the central doctrine by which segregation is upheld and enforced in America today.

Today, in 17 states and the District of Columbia, Negroes are forced by law to attend schools set apart for them. Our courts have upheld this segregation on the assumption that these schools give "separate and equal" facilities to colored Americans.

This clear distortion of our Constitution was promulgated in 1896, when the white South, with the aid of the conservative North, had succeeded in pressing the Negro back into second-class citizenship. First the Court held that Negroes could be forced to ride in segregated railway coaches if the facilities were equal. Then it applied the "separate-but-equal" dictum to all other public services.

For 54 years separation has been upheld in the name of equality. Separation has been rigidly enforced while equality has been altogether ignored. This was not a matter of policy alone. It was inherent in the entire situation. The very states which took advantage of the doctrine to establish a dual school system are the ones which lack the resources to maintain one adequate school system. Today, if all the money spent on separate schools for Negroes in the South were diverted to the support of white public schools, the average expenditure per white child would still be less than the average per capita spent on common schools for the nation as a whole. The US Office of Education pointed out in its last printed Biennial Report (1945-46) that ". . . 44 percent would have to be added to Negro teachers' salaries, 80 percent to all current expenses, and 420 percent to plant and equipment values to equalize them, dollar

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for dollar, with white schools in the same states." And it has been estimated by the *New South* (December, 1948-January, 1949) that it would take $500 million to equalize white and Negro elementary-school buildings alone.

While there is at least one state-supported college for Negroes in each of the 17 Southern states, more than three times as many curricular offerings are available in the white colleges; libraries, laboratory equipment and faculty personnel show even greater inequalities. But what is more important than the fact that gross disparity obtains between the college facilities actually provided for Negroes and those provided for whites is that in most instances few or no graduate or professional-school facilities are provided for Negro students. In 16 Southern states, with the exceptions noted later, no professional work and no graduate work leading to the doctorate are offered for Negroes. On the other hand, there is at least one publicly supported university in each of these states providing graduate and professional work for white students in practically all the major fields of graduate study and in the major professions. There are 14 medical schools as against none for Negroes; 16 law schools against five for Negroes; some 16 or more engineering schools, none for Negroes; a half-dozen or more library schools, one for Negroes; and five dental schools, none for Negroes.

The exceptions to this rule have grown out of a legal campaign begun in the mid-thirties by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. Around 1934, the NAACP began to bring these inequalities to the attention of the courts. In 1938, the US Supreme Court handed down the "Gaines" decision, in which it ruled that similar educational opportunity afforded white students within a state must also be provided for Negroes within the state. As a consequence, several states have attempted to establish segregated graduate and professional work at the Negro state colleges. Thus, nine states have established some graduate work of limited quantity and questionable quality at the Negro state colleges, but have confined it to the master's degree primarily in the field of education. A separate Negro law school has been established in five of these states; a separate journalism school in one; and a library-study curriculum and a program in public health in another.

The separate schools thus established are obviously inferior to the graduate and professional schools for white students. All competent and impartial observers agree that not only are these separate schools inferior, but that they will continue to be so.

Accordingly, the next step in the NAACP's legal campaign was to challenge the supposed equality of these schools and the validity of the "separate-but-equal" doctrine. As an initial result, a few Negroes have been admitted to various curricula in state universities which have hitherto been closed to them because of race.*

The two cases which are the subject of this article—those of Sweatt and McLaurin—are a part of the series of events just described and grew out of the following incidents. In the first case, Heman Marion Sweatt first applied to enter the law school of the University of Texas in 1946, and was refused admission. At that time no attempt had been made to set up a law school for Negroes. Sweatt filed suit. The lower court ruled that Sweatt had been denied his constitutional rights; it gave the state six months in which to establish a law school for him. The state immediately set up a law "school," which Sweatt declined to enter because he alleged it did not afford him equal opportunity for a legal education. The lower court held that the state had complied. The case was carried to the appellate court, which remanded it. The case was heard a second time in the lower court in May, 1947; Sweatt lost and appealed to the Supreme Court of Texas in 1948. He lost again. The US Supreme Court was petitioned to hear the case, and agreed. (Incidentally, last fall, a Negro student applied to the medical school of the University of Texas. Although the officials of the University refused to admit him as a student, he was accepted for instruction in the medical school, but was forced to register as a student in the Negro state university rather than in the University of Texas.)

As a result of the Ada Lois Sipuel case, in which the US Supreme Court ordered the University of Oklahoma to provide her with equal opportunities, a few Negroes have been admitted to several schools of the University, with varying degrees of segregation imposed. The most publicized instance is that of a student, G. W. McLaurin, who was admitted to do graduate work leading to a doctorate in education, under certain segregated conditions.

At first, McLaurin was given a special desk in the

* State-supported universities in seven states and privately supported institutions in three additional states (Missouri, North Carolina and Virginia) and the District of Columbia have recently admitted a few Negroes to various graduate and professional curricula. Since 1935, Negroes have attended the law school of the University of Maryland, and some 20 are now enrolled. For the past 10 years the University of West Virginia has been admitting Negroes to various curricula at the University which are not available at the Negro state college. The University of Arkansas admitted a Negro to its law school in 1947 upon a segregated basis, but eliminated the segregation the next year, when a young Negro woman was admitted to its medical school. Three or four Negroes are reported to be enrolled in law and medicine, without segregation, at the present time. In 1948, the University of Delaware announced that it would admit Negroes to curricula given at the University which were not otherwise available to them. Several Negroes attended the University last summer and a few are now studying there. Last year the University of Kentucky began to admit Negroes to those curricula which were offered at the University but not available at the Negro state college. A score or more Negroes took courses last summer and a smaller but appreciable number are currently enrolled.

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vestibule of the main classroom; he was permitted to use the library, provided he took his books to a special desk on the mezzanine floor; and he was allowed to eat in the cafeteria, provided he ate at a different time and at a special table set apart for him. "Subsequent to the hearing and judgment in the lower court, appellant, McLaurin, was permitted to go into the regular classroom and sit in a section surrounded by a rail on which there was a large sign stating, 'Reserved for Colored.' At the beginning of the last semester, February, 1950, the rail and sign were removed." (Brief for Appellant, pp. 9-10.) McLaurin has appealed his case to the US Supreme Court, maintaining that the educational opportunity afforded him under the above conditions is not equal to that afforded non-Negro students at the University of Oklahoma. The Court is now considering the case, along with the Sweatt case, and the Henderson case (which involves the question of segregated dining-car service).

Whatever other issues may be involved in these two cases, the basic point is clear: namely, whether equality of treatment is possible under enforced segregation based solely upon race. Legal experts say that is is possible for the Court to render a decision favorable to the petitioner in each of these cases and the Henderson case without passing upon the validity of the "separate-but-equal" doctrine. The Court could hold that the Negro law school in Texas is not equal to the law school of the University of Texas, and could merely rule that the Interstate Commerce Commission erred in holding that the segregation of Henderson in this particular instance did not constitute a violation of the Interstate Commerce Act.

The main reliance of those who maintain that "separate-but-equal" educational opportunity is possible under the Constitution is the ruling of the US Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896. Here the Court held in its majority opinion that separate but equal railroad cars did not infringe the Constitutional rights of Negroes because, among other things, they ". . . did not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other"; the assumption presumably being that if they did, such provisions would be unconstitutional. However, Associate Justice Harlan pointed out in his famous dissenting opinion: "We boast of the freedom enjoyed by our people above all other peoples. But it is difficult to reconcile that boast with a state of the law which, practically, put the brand of servitude and degradation upon a large class of our fellow-citizens, our equals before the law. The disguise of 'equal' accommodations . . . will not mislead anyone, nor atone for the wrong this day done." Whatever basis the majority of the Court thought it had for holding such a view in 1896, before a considerable body of fact and expert opinion had been amassed, that basis certainly does not obtain in 1950. Fifty-four years of experience have demonstrated that as a matter of actual fact "separate-but-equal" schools have never existed, nor do they obtain at the present time, and it is the consensus of impartial expert opinion that they are impossible of attainment. The Court would render a great service to the American people if it would reëxamine this doctrine *per se*.

It should be reiterated that common sense and expert testimony indicate that "separate-but-equal" educational opportunity based upon race has never existed, does not now exist, and under any reasonable interpretation of "equal" is not possible. The President's Committee on Civil Rights concluded that ". . . not even the most mathematically precise equality of segregated institutions can properly be considered equality under the law." Even the President's Commission on Higher Education found that ". . . the separate and equal principle has nowhere been fully honored. . . . This Commission concludes that there will be no fundamental correction of the total condition until segregation legislation is repealed."

Southern white educators and students have become so tired of the hypocrisy and chicanery necessary to support the "separate-but-equal" fiction in higher education in the South that only last year a poll of the teachers in white Southern colleges and universities revealed that 68 percent of them indicated that the only real solution to the problem was to admit Negroes to the existing Southern universities now. Moreover, the Solicitor General of the United States, who has submitted briefs as *amicus curiae* in all three cases, points out that " 'Equal' facilities, if separate, are rarely if ever equal, even in a physical sense. In most situations they have been used to cloak glaring inequalities. And the very idea of separate facilities, or separate rights, is in itself a negation of the full and complete possession of privileges and immunities of citizenship. . . . 'Separate but equal' is a Constitutional anachronism which no longer deserves a place in our law."

The significance of the Sweatt and McLaurin cases is found in the fact that for the first time in 54 years validity of the "separate-but-equal" doctrine has been directly challenged and the Supreme Court has consented to review three cases involving it. What the Court will decide, of course we do not know. We do know, however, that the very issue of democracy as we have proclaimed it to the world is at stake. In spite of any legal technicalities that may be employed, if the highest tribunal in this country declares that segregation based upon race, color or creed is compatible with democracy, or even evades the issue, then we shall have suffered a grievous setback in our fight (if we shall not have actually lost it) for the moral leadership of the world.

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HAROLD L. ICKES: "Kerr's Asphyxiation Bill"

INSTEAD OF GOING to the help of their party when it was threatened with asphyxiation by the Kerr gas bill, the Democratic leaders in both Senate and House either ran out, as did Senator Lucas, or rushed to the help of the oil and gas interests, *à la* Speaker Rayburn. It was a cynical performance, especially in an election year, by a party that poses as "the friend of the people," "the champion of the downtrodden."

In the Senate, five Republicans and nine Democrats did not vote. Since the bill carried by a vote of 44-38, it will be seen that there were enough non-voting Democrats to have saved their party from embarrassment. In other words, so far as the Senate vote on the bill is concerned, the Republicans, during the campaign that is already upon us, will be able to show a sounder state of health than the Democrats. On the other hand, it was the able Democratic Senator from Illinois, Paul H. Douglas, who led the opposition to the anti-monopoly forces. His vigorous and intelligent fight was in strange contrast with the absence of Majority Leader Lucas, who was out in Illinois trying to shepherd voters for himself next November. It might be that a Majority Leader who is absent when a crucial vote is being taken will lose more votes in November in his own race for reëlection than he would have done if he had fought the Kerr bill of the oil-gas conspirators in the Senate.

While the non-voting Democrats helped by indirection in the Senate, Speaker Rayburn worked for the oil-gas interests with all his might. He left the rostrum to make an impassioned appeal for the passage of a vicious bill which was against the public interest. Senator Connally's vote for those preferred constituents of his is understandable. He always has been their bellwether. But it was saddening to Speaker Rayburn's friends to hear him remind the members of the House that his record had been one of serving the people against special interests. In the circumstances, his protestation of past virtue was not convincing. It may be that, to a Texan, the enormous oil and gas interests of Texas are not the "special interests" that they would be if they were located in southern New York.

Speaker Rayburn further said: "In my opinion this bill will not raise the price of natural gas to any consumer by one red cent." But why did he not offer such an amendment as was proposed by Mr. O'Mahoney in the Senate? Without an amendment protecting the consumer, Mr. Rayburn's assurance was mere words, as was a similar hollow promise by Senator Kerr of Oklahoma. And why the Kerr bill at all, if the purpose is not to enrich further the "independent" gas operators of the country? It should be realized that the word "independent," when applied to gas interests, does not exclude even the largest companies. It merely covers the gas producers that do not themselves own or control the pipelines that carry the gas to market.

Some of the great oil companies have vast holdings of gas. The Kerr bill invites, even urges, these to raise the price. Only the federal government can keep the price at a fair level. If prices are raised against the pipelines and not against the ultimate consumers, as some guess, it will nevertheless mean an unfair profit on a natural resource which should be made available as widely as possible for home-heating and manufacturing purposes. Whoever would seem to pay the "Kerr-price" for gas, the people would pay in the end. They always do. Moreover, if the purpose of Senator Kerr and his associates, who would raise the price of gas, was not to increase it, why did they go to the trouble of forcing through Congress a bill to do this and why did they brutally assail Leland Olds when he was renominated by President Truman as a member of the Federal Power Commission?

The Kerr bill may be more than controversial; so far as the Democrats are concerned, it may be sacrificial. The people have been becoming more and more aware of the encroachments, not only upon our economy, but upon our political freedom, by unscrupulous and grasping oil and gas and utility interests. Nothing is better calculated to arouse their just resentment than an oily and gaseous multi-millionaire Senator taking advantage of his office to increase his already great income. Cynically, Senator Kerr chose to ignore Rule 12 of the Senate to the effect that a Senator shall not vote on any matter in which he has a personal interest. Mr. Kerr not only voted for such a bill; he was mainly responsible for its passage through the Senate, as was Speaker Rayburn in the House.

It would have been a salutary thing for the Democratic Party if the Republicans had been brighter and had left it to an inept and irresponsible Democratic leadership to bear the onus of a bill that stinks. It passed the House by a vote of 176 to 174 as the result of a quick shift of three Republican votes, those of Paul W. Shafer (R, Mich.), Earl Wilson (R, Ind.) and Henry J. Latham (R, N. Y.). It was too much to expect the Republicans to make political sense. Perhaps Representative Crosser of Ohio was a true prophet when he declared: "The wrath of the American people will rise and plague those responsible for this legislation." And if this should happen, words uttered by Representative Dingell (D, Mich.) during the debate will serve as a fitting epilogue to their ignoble public careers: "Horse thieves have been hanged for lesser crimes."

HAROLD L. ICKES

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BOOKS IN REVIEW

THE SLOW DEATH OF BRITISH CAPITALISM

by Norman MacKenzie

LIKE KING CHARLES, British capitalism has been an unconscionable time a-dying. Symptoms of its sickness appeared about 1880, when it first began to feel the pinch of overseas competition. The free-trade economy worked as long as Britain retained industrial supremacy and the terms of trade remained in Britain's favor. But capitalism ran into serious difficulties once these conditions changed. It was pressed hard at home by an emergent labor movement, and shaken by the heavy cost of the First World War. It responded by a retreat into protection and the creation of restrictive monopolies—and was hit hard again by the depression of the thirties and by another and even more damaging war. Then, in 1945, along came the first majority Labour Government, decently to bury the corpse of British capitalism. This, briefly, is the story that Keith Hutchison tells.

THE DECLINE AND FALL OF BRITISH CAPITALISM, by Keith Hutchison (Scribner's; $3.50).

His book, which is brightly written, marshals well the familiar facts, but it contains nothing new for anyone who has more than a nodding acquaintance with British socialist writing over the last 15 years. It describes succinctly how the capitalist economy broke down in Britain; how the Liberal Party, having completed the struggle for formal political democracy, disintegrated because it was incapable of facing the economic struggle that remained; how the Labour Party inherited the Liberal tradition and, by blending it skillfully with gradualist socialism, eventually came to power.

But Hutchison never faces the question that is posed implicitly by his title. One can accept without argument the thesis that British capitalism has declined; but has it yet *fallen*? The author is more or less content to say that it has and to leave the matter there.

Yet this is the crucial question. For on the answer depends the future tactics of the Labour Party. Hutchison thinks—and there are many in Britain who share this view—that the Labour victory in 1945 "presaged a change from a society which was still essentially capitalistic, although tempered by many socialist innovations, to one basically socialist despite numerous capitalist survivals."

If this is true, then the Labour Party has won a decisive victory, and unless the British economy is wrecked by external crisis, there is the prospect of a steady and uninterrupted march toward the horizon of greater social welfare and equality. If, however, Hutchison is wrong, then the future is not secure, and the Labour Party must prepare for bitter political battles ahead.

I think he is wrong, for two reasons. First, though he dismisses in a phrase those "socialists who believe that the citadel of capitalism is still intact even if its outposts have been captured," he never gives an adequate reply to their argument. He underestimates both the tenacity of British capitalism and the reserves which it still possesses. Second, he errs, in my opinion, because he misreads the evidence he himself presents. Throughout, he equates capitalism with the free-market system, operating under a tax structure that leaves room both for private investment and for considerable incentives to the entrepreneur. But, to argue from the growing restrictions upon the free-market system and from an increasingly onerous tax structure that capitalism is no longer dominant in the British economy, is to conjure capitalism away by sleight of definition. One could just as well argue that capitalism had been destroyed when the protected market replaced the free market and monopoly replaced competition.

The real issue for socialists is twofold: who makes the ultimate decisions as to what shall be produced, and who profits from that production? State ownership of one-fifth of the economy, some degree of direction over the remaining four-fifths, coupled with a policy of social welfare financed by heavy taxation, do not make the whole economy socialist with mere "capitalist survivals."

I am aware that a great many Americans believe that the Labour Government now possesses such powers of planning and direction as to give it authority to make ultimate decisions. But I do not think that the case is proved by the experience of the last five years. A careful examination of the present planning machinery reveals that it is inadequate and that private enterprise retains much greater control over its affairs than is generally realized.

It is true that if a Tory Government again came to power, it would have to accept much of the Labour Party's social achievements, unless it were prepared to risk embittered and widespread opposition. But the point is not whether the Tories would or would not be willing to take that risk and to pursue a deflationary policy, attacking welfare benefits and wages in an attempt to restore the margin that British capitalism has lost. The point is whether they *could* do it if they took the risk. Hutchison's argument is that British capitalism *cannot* make a comeback. The facts, in my judgment, do not justify his optimism.

I have dwelt on this aspect of his book because it is the vital issue and because we urgently need more discussion and more research upon it. I have little to quarrel with in his history, except that his book would have had greater force if he had given more space to his summary of the doctrines of British socialism and had shown how its differences from European socialism are integrally linked with the differences between the history of capitalism in Europe and in Britain.

Norman MacKenzie is a member of the editorial staff of the New Statesman and Nation *(London). He is the author of* Argentina *and* Outline History of Socialism.

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THE SEA AND THE CITY

THE ENCHAFÈD FLOOD, by W. H. Auden (Random House; $2.50).

THIS INTERESTING and ingenious book consists of three essays (originally given as lectures at the University of Virginia) which explore the significance of certain recurring symbols in romantic literature, especially those associated with the sea. The sea, Auden explains, is the symbol of the primordial undifferentiated flux, and in Biblical and classical literature is used to represent the antithesis of what is good (*i. e.*, ordered and civilized) in society. The metaphor of the ship of state is used only when the state is in danger; when things are normal and stable the image is the City or the Garden. Sea voyages (those of Ulysses or Jason, for example) may be necessary as means to an end, but they are never good in themselves. Dante's Ulysses, who willfully sails out in old age to seek adventure for adventure's sake, is guilty of Adam's sin—pride—and is properly found by Dante in Hell.

The romantic attitude to the sea is different. To the romantic poets there is something noble and magnificent in leaving the land and the city for nameless adventures. No longer is the sea a necessary evil, but the symbol of the permanent condition of man, for life is a voyage through troubled seas to an unknown destination. The Ulysses of Tennyson's poem is a hero, not a sinner.

The romantics similarly reinterpret the desert, which in earlier literature was either a place where the water of life was lacking (Ezekiel's valley of dry bones); a wilderness outside the city, resort of outlaws and scapegoats (Cain, Ishmael) and of meditative men who withdraw for the purpose of self-examination and purification (Jesus in the wilderness); a barren place *between* one city and another, to be crossed by the hero in search of the promised land or the New Life; or a waste land made barren as the result of a catastrophe wrought by man's own evil, awaiting the arrival of the stranger hero who brings redemption.

The romantic sea and the romantic desert have many points of resemblance: both lie outside normal human society and therefore represent areas in which the individual is free from the evils and responsibilities of community life; both are places of alienation and of nostalgic regret. They are thus places of freedom and solitude, but the sea differs from the desert in that it possesses movement and vitality, thus becoming a symbol of primitive potential power. When the City (civilization) becomes itself corrupt and frustrating, as industrial society became in the eyes of the romantics, both the sea and the desert, but especially the former, assume impressive symbolic meanings which reflect the artist's repudiation of a society which has no real communal vitality and makes for the annihilation of personality. Auden discovers these meanings in Baudelaire and Whitman, in "The Hunting of the Snark" and the limericks of Edward Lear, in "The Ancient Mariner" and *Moby Dick*, and in the process of presenting his discoveries reveals his own position as what might be called a neo-Christian symbolist who combines an interest in what it is now fashionable to call "archetypal images" in literature with a fascination with the role of the hero, both esthetic and religious.

The value of this book lies less in its generalizations, suggestive and often illuminating though these are, than in the detailed illustrations, which are discussed with an almost irresponsible zest. The examination of the characters of *Moby Dick*, which occupies a large part of the book, is brilliantly done and makes other attempts to read the novel as a simple allegory look silly (Auden is fully aware of the difference between symbolism and allegory). The irresponsibility is seen when he projects a symbolic meaning beyond what the text can possibly justify (as when he says of the Biblical Ishmael that he "is sorry because his love is not returned"). Yet the ideas Auden throws out have value independent of their real or supposed relation to the texts in which he claims to find them.

It is interesting to see the vivacity of mind of the early Auden now operating in a field which has hitherto been reserved for humorless psychologists and prematurely pompous young professors. These essays are both playful and profound, and though it can be charged that in turning his interest to myth and symbol in a framework of neo-Christian values Auden is following a contemporary fashion, it is clear that he is not following it merely because it *is* a fashion, but because he is excited by this kind of thinking. And he can communicate his excitement to the reader.

DAVID DAICHES

STATUS OF THE NEGRO

KILLERS OF THE DREAM, by Lillian Smith (W. W. Norton; $3).

NEGROES IN AMERICAN SOCIETY, by Maurice R. Davie (Whittlesey House; $6).

THE NEGRO'S MORALE, by Arnold M. Rose (University of Minnesota Press; $2.50).

I REMEMBER the first time I saw Lillian Smith. It was at a convention of the Americans for Democratic Action in Philadelphia; I had spoken, and Miss Smith rose to comment on my speech. I remember my impression of her then: a sincere woman, greatly concerned with the problems of racial discrimination under discussion there. But to a Negro, brought up in the slums, participant in youthful race riots, acquainted with the frustrations and bitterness and hopelessness of the poor whites and Negroes, her words seemed pitifully unreal. Her latest book produces the same feeling. There is much truth in it. She depicts accurately some of the emotional effects of prejudice on sensitive Southerners. But *Killers of the Dream* is not, as it would like to be, a psychoanalysis of the South; it is a psychoanalysis of a segment of the Southern middle class: the segment near to Miss Smith in sensitivity and awareness.

Childhood, she says, is the white Southerner's burden—childhood, in which he learned of sin, sex and segregation. The man grown from that past is a dreamer of man's dignity, but destroyer of the dignity of the Negro, and he is plagued by guilt. For he has memories of his Negro "mammy." (How many tenant farmers and laborers had mammies?) The Southern woman, meanwhile, is robbed of her proper function as mother because of the mammies; she is placed on a pedestal by her man, who secretly meets with Negro women. (How many wives of sharecroppers, tenant farmers, of factory laborers have mammies?) The great distances of the South, and the vast darknesses of its empty places, have all accentuated the mysticism surround-

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ing the manias of sin, sex and segregation.

What is the hope for the future of these people, of this region? That, somehow, the Southerner regain his sense of moral values. That he make two journeys, which "we all" must make, "into our own heart, accepting what we find there; and into the world, accepting it as our home." We must "grow in men a conscience mature enough, inclusive enough, to meet the needs of all men on earth." We can do nothing until we all decide upon "these three things: our wants, our survival needs, our belief as to what is right." And how soon is this to be accomplished? "There is no choice. It has to be now."

It is like waiting for people to become religious. I want so much to believe Miss Smith. But has she ever lived in the slums? Has she ever lived through the vicious circle of prejudice leading to economic deprivation, leading to fewer educational opportunities, leading to ignorance and crime and bad conduct, leading to more prejudice? Has she known the landlords who maintain the Negro ghetto for profits? Or the politicians, North and South, who carefully cultivate prejudice in the ignorant and impoverished? Most pertinent of all, has she been the Negro who must wait for the prejudiced white Southerner "by an agonizing pull of his dream" to "wrench himself out of such fixating stuff and climb thin air into the unknown"?

I want to praise *Negroes in American Society.* As a general text, it is unequaled by anything I have read. Combining extensive research with knowledge of the sociological and economic factors which have influenced Negro progress in this country, Maurice R. Davie, head of the Department of Sociology at Yale University, presents a sweeping picture of the Negro in the United States.

One could hardly ask for more in a book of this kind. Briefly but pertinently, Davie depicts the transformation of the Negro from African native to slave to "free" man; from here he branches out into Negro life today, accompanying the text with statistics and tempering facts with a sense of history. This is where the Negro came from, Davie is saying; this is where he is now, and this is how he got here. Trends and emotions are analyzed. Progress in nearly every field is correctly diagnosed, and comparison is made with the progress of Negroes freed from slavery in the South American countries. An excellent bibliography follows each chapter.

A word should be said about the style. Few texts, in my opinion, have been so well written or so well organized; every fact and conclusion is pertinent and none is extended beyond its importance.

Arnold M. Rose, an associate professor of History at the University of Minnesota, aided Gunnar Myrdal in preparation of the famous *An American Dilemma.* Now, under the auspices of the American Jewish Congress, he has come forth with a small volume of his own, *The Negro's Morale,* in which he succeeds in analyzing and interpreting the attitudes of Negroes toward one another and toward American society.

Vertically, through time, the attitudes of Negroes have undergone great changes. In certain periods, such as slavery, many Negroes were inclined to view themselves almost as the white man did: with contempt. Since then, their attitude has fluctuated with their circumstances. At present, Negro race pride is high—and is growing.

Horizontally, through space and through classes, Rose considers the somewhat different attitudes of Southern and Northern, and upper and lower-class, Negroes. Some near-white Negroes, and some Negroes of wealth, have only contempt for the race to which they belong. The morale of the Northern Negro is higher than that of the Southern.

Political potency, the general recognition of Negroes like Dr. Ralph Bunche, the strength and vigor of Negro newspapers and the growth of strong protest organizations are cited as factors increasing the identification and pride of the Negro toward his race as a whole. Conversely, color prejudice within the race, as well as economic exploitation of the lower by the higher-class Negroes, tends to weaken such identification.

The reader of this book will come away with a clearer understanding of some of the psychological effects of racial bigotry. WILLIAM GARDNER SMITH

William Gardner Smith, author of Last of the Conquerors, *is a reporter for the Pittsburgh Courier. His second novel,* The Red Brick Castle, *will be published this year.*

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MOVIES

Not Very Funny

THEORIES APLENTY can, and will, be advanced to explain the disaster that has overtaken the Marx Brothers in "Love Happy." Groucho's share in the picture is so small and so peripheral that it seems to have been dubbed in; that inspired stooge, the late Margaret Dumont, has proved to be irreplaceable; the supply of labyrinthine puns and word games has faltered; the pace is off, the surprise is gone, the innocence is lost, we are all a lot older. These explanations are pertinent, but they still do not explain how three of the most brilliant and knowing clowns in the modern theatre can fall so completely to pieces.

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It is painful to watch "Love Happy"; not because it is worse (in truth, it is better) than a good deal of what Hollywood offers as humor. It is painful because right along we have been partners in the Marx Brothers' involved, boisterous and slightly malicious joke on humanity. They are masters of the tricks that make an audience feel part of the act, and the sense of participation has outlived the comedy. When the Marx Brothers go flat, everyone feels deflated; "Love Happy" is a public calamity.

The English "Bond Street" is recommended for those who are refreshed by a spell of easy weeping uncomplicated by tragedy and are titillated by the irony of mechanical coincidence. It is a four-part contrivance in which we learn the "human" dramas behind a wedding gown, a pearl necklace, a veil and a corsage of flowers, all delivered by Bond Street shops to a lovely girl on her wedding day. The incidents concern birth and love and death; they are homely and touching, some sordid, some gallant. The picture is nicely done, with careful acting and pleasant good taste, but the contents are as dispassionately unimportant as a company of strangers seen through the wrong end of a telescope.

The advertising for "Bond Street" features Roland Young, and he is indeed excellent. But admirers of his imperturbable cynicism should be warned that he appears only in the fourth episode.

"The Scandals of Clochemerle" is being promoted locally as the picture that made Paris blush. Unless the Parisians have developed a new, postwar prudery, the boast is unconvincing: "Clochemerle" is the kind of farce that France has been taking in its stride since Rabelais. It may, however, have made them squirm in their seats.

There are three sources for the alleged humor in this film: the citizens of Clochemerle erect a *pissoir* in the church plaza as a defiant symbol of anti-clerical *égalité*; the wives and daughters of the local worthies accept with bovine equanimity the advances of any and all passersby; the schoolmaster, a fanatic rationalist, offends his companions by extreme foulness of breath. Laughter has been extracted on occasion from ideas no more promising than these (on second thought, I except the disability of the schoolmaster; no humor has ever been derived from halitosis), but they require deftness and an innocent gayety. "The Scandals of Clochemerle" is heavily roguish and as innocent as *La Vie Parisienne*.

To make matters worse, the poor thing this movie tries to do it does badly. It is peopled with extravagant and obvious types who have been instructed to look as funny as possible and it is played before sets so patently cardboard that they seem to sway as the performers walk past. There have been some public charges that "Clochemerle" is obscene, but that is foolish; it is no worse than an attack of the scatalogical giggles. ROBERT HATCH

MUSIC: Grass-Roots "Parsifal"

ON PALM SUNDAY, Bloomington, Indiana, turned into a Midwestern Bayreuth, as the Indiana University School of Music gave its second annual presentation of Wagner's "Parsifal." An audience of 2,000, some of whom made the 40-mile trip from Indianapolis, arrived at four o'clock for the opera, which was given in Bayreuth fashion, with a long dinner intermission between the first and second acts. The entire cast except the Gurnemanz, who is a member of the faculty, and the entire orchestra and stage crew were drawn from the student body of the School of Music.

Last year, when Dean Wilfred Bain announced that Indiana University would present the first school performance of "Parsifal" ever given in the United States, I, like other observers from a distance of a thousand miles, was skeptical of the project. It sounded suspiciously like a bid for publicity rather than an honest artistic enterprise. "Parsifal," conceived for the special milieu of the Festspielhaus in Bayreuth, requires a skill in technical pro-

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duction and in the preservation of its mystical mood which even a professional company like the Metropolitan achieves only occasionally.

I was dead wrong, as I discovered when I went to Bloomington for this year's performance. Beyond all comparison, this is the most remarkable operatic production I have seen in an American school. The stage director was Hans Busch—son of the conductor Fritz Busch—whom Bain brought from the Stockholm Royal Opera to take charge of the year-around program of operatic staging at Indiana University. The musical director was Ernst Hoffman, an admirable musician with years of practical experience in German opera houses and as conductor, before Efrem Kurtz, of the Houston Symphony Orchestra. Neither of these men recognizes any distinction between professionalism and amateurism. Under their guidance the students had been held sternly to standards of first-rate performance.

On the ample stage of the university auditorium—"one of the good deeds of the WPA," Bain calls it—the visual aspects of the opera were considerably more satisfying than they are at the Metropolitan. Simply mounted, with only a few token suggestions of realism, the scenes were given illusion by expert, appropriate, and flexible lighting and by continuous ensemble acting that spared us the traditional semaphoric gestures and pseudo-spiritual deadpan delivery. The devotional qualities of the first and third acts were humanized to a degree I had not supposed possible —perhaps because the young singers have not been corrupted by the cynicism of the professional opera house. Perhaps, also, because they sang in English, a language both they and the audience could understand.

The adequacy of the vocalism was one of the chief surprises of this grass-roots "Parsifal." Not only was the singing unexceptionable in style; the voices were well trained for operatic projection, and nearly everyone sang with real expressiveness. The only weak section was the second act, in which the youthful Klingsor lacked the malignancy to be a commanding personification of evil. The whole time, Hoffman's student orchestra maintained an excellent balance with the voices, and played eloquently, zealously—and in tune.

The audience was deeply moved by the genuineness of the occasion, and so was I. Originally conceived as a one-time project, "Parsifal" has almost inadvertently become an annual rite at Bloomington. It is a distinguished achievement.

The "Parsifal" production is only one manifestation of a large-scale operatic enterprise at Indiana University. A generous state legislature has now provided, in addition to the big 3,500-seat auditorium, a smaller opera house, East Hall, seating 1,200. Completed this year, East Hall has $40,000 worth of the latest stage and lighting equipment, and acoustics that make every word intelligible in the back rows. Last month Busch and Hoffman gave three performances of Puccini's "La Bohème" in the smaller theatre. In May, contemporary music will be served by a double bill containing the premières of two operas by American composers—"The Jumping Frog of Calaveras County," based by Lukas Foss on Mark Twain's story, and "The Veil," with music by Bernard Rogers and a libretto by Robert Lawrence. Two years ago Kurt Weill allotted the first performance of "Down in the Valley" to Indiana University.

The largest and best-equipped undertaking of its sort, the Indiana project is an impressive manifestation of the ardent interest in operatic production that is spreading through the universities and music schools of the country. At the University of Southern California, remarkable performances—among them Strauss's "Ariadne auf Naxos" and Britten's "Albert Herring"—have been staged by Carl Ebert, *régisseur* of the famous Glyndebourne Opera in England. At Stanford University, Jan Popper, who has since moved to the University of California at Los Angeles, gave Britten's "Peter Grimes" in a manner said to have been a great improvement over the Metropolitan's dealings with the work. At Tanglewood, under Boris Goldovsky, and at the Juilliard School of Music, under Frederic Cohen, new and old operas have been presented in stimulating fashion. More and more, the schools—despite the inexperience of student performers, and their inevitable vocal limitations—are becoming the exponents, and actually the saviors, of an art that is, generally speaking, too expensive to support without subsidy.

CECIL SMITH

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Mrs. Martin Sullivan, wife of Lieut. Col. Sullivan of Camp Stoneman, will present a program on the art and flowers of the Japanese people at the tea given by the California Spring Blossom and Wild Flower Association. . . . Mrs. Sullivan will show for the first time some of the treasures which she was able to gather from the ruins of the Japanese cities. – *From the San Francisco* Evening News.

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(*Continued from page 4*)

proceeds will be paid to the United States. . . . Neither land nor oil of the United States is being disposed of unlawfully or improvidently as a result of this operating stipulation.

In his final paragraph, Mr. Ickes reverts to a subject which he discussed in the August 15, 1949, issue of the *New Republic—i.e.*, the August, 1947, opinions of the undersigned and of Attorney General Clark to the effect that the Federal Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 does not apply to the submerged coastal lands. Mr. Ickes is critical of these opinions as "favoring the oil companies" and as an "unconditional surrender to the oil interests."

In addition to the fact that Mr. Ickes himself, while Secretary of the Interior, officially expressed the view before the Senate Judiciary Committee on February 5, 1946, "that the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 is not applicable to submerged lands," it perhaps should be mentioned that at least two Solicitors of the Department of the Interior during Mr. Ickes' regime as Secretary—Messrs. Fowler V. Harper and Warner W. Gardner—took the position in memoranda dated March 24, 1945, and January 18, 1946, respectively, that the applicability of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 to submerged coastal lands "was doubtful." It is significant that Solicitors Harper and Gardner expressed their views prior to the enactment of the Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands on August 7, 1947. In that act, Congress confirmed the doubts of Messrs. Harper and Gardner by clearly indicating its understanding that the submerged coastal lands were not subject to the provisions of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920.

I have been unable to find any record of the view of Mr. Ickes' first Solicitor, the late Judge Nathan R. Margold, concerning the applicability of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 to the submerged coastal lands. In an opinion dated November 22, 1940, Judge Margold indicated a belief that the authority of the Secretary of the Interior under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 should be broadly construed so as to make the law generally applicable to all government-owned lands (other than those expressly excepted by the language of the Act). However, two points should be mentioned in connection with that opinion: (1) it dealt specifically with the question whether the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 was applicable to certain areas which had been acquired by the War Department in the course of its rivers and harbors improvement program, and it did not consider or discuss the applicability of the Act to submerged coastal lands beneath the open sea; and (2) Judge Margold's opinion was overruled by Attorney General (now Supreme Court Justice) Robert H. Jackson in an opinion dated January 3, 1941.

Finally, attention should be called to the fact that 10 suits have been instituted against the Secretary of the Interior to test the correctness of the 1947 opinions respecting the inapplicability of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 to submerged coastal lands. The question presumably will be decided in the courts, and not in Mr. Ickes' column.

MASTIN G. WHITE, Solicitor,
US Department of the Interior
Washington, D.C.

SIR: I shall not attempt to answer Mr. White's arguments except to make one or two points. Mr. White quotes the late Judge Margold, when he was Interior's Solicitor, as having written an opinion on the Federal Mineral Leasing Act in 1940 to the effect that this Act should be "broadly construed so as to make the law generally applicable to all government-owned lands." This is precisely what I have been urging all along. On the contrary, Mr. White, in the opinion written by Mr. Edelstein, said flatly that the law did not apply. On the same page, Mr. White says that "during Mr. Ickes' regime as Secretary, Messrs. Fowler V. Harper and Warner W. Gardner, took the positions . . . respectively, that the applicability of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 to submerged coastal lands 'was doubtful'." I have never said that the law would have been a perfect instrument for granting leases to the off-shore oil deposits, but I have insisted—and still do—that in any question affecting a government where doubt exists, that doubt should be resolved in favor of the government.

Washington, D. C. HAROLD L. ICKES

LID Anniversary

SIR: May we take this opportunity to call to the attention of the *New Republic* readers the Forty-fifth Anniversary Luncheon of the League for Industrial Democracy, to be held at the Hotel Commodore, New York, on Saturday, April 15. The luncheon will deal with "Freedom and the Welfare State," and be addressed by Senator Herbert H. Lehman, Social Security Administrator Oscar R. Ewing, Walter P. Reuther, president, UAW-CIO, George Meany, secretary-treasurer, AFL, and Executive Director Laidler. Nathaniel M. Minkoff will preside. Margaret Herbison, British Labor MP and Undersecretary of State for Scotland, will extend greetings from British labor. A citation will be given to Senator Lehman. . . .

Many *New Republic* readers will undoubtedly want to extend greetings to the League and to Senator Lehman at its luncheon and morning and afternoon round-table discussions. . . .

HARRY W. LAIDLER,
New York City Executive Director

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

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